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This paper is the third of a series of three monographs concerned with the 
technology of the cement producing sector in Latin America. The first one dealt 
with the nature and kind of technical innovation that has taken place in the 
industry in recent years and analysed the international structure of the sector 
that supplies capital goods and technical know-how to cement producers. 
The second monograph was a case study of the Mexican cement industry, 
detailing the level of technology incorporated into de productive capacity of the 
sector, as well as analysing the market structure and recent growth of the 
industry. 
This present paper which describes the cement industry in Argentina is 
similar in scope to the Mexican paper; it analyses the level of technology 
incorporated into the cement industry in Argentina, and the economic structure 
and growth of the sector. However, there is an important difference in the 
approach of this paper as compared with the one on Mexico. In the present paper 
I have tried to place the analysis of technical development and market structure 
within an overall historical context describing the development of the Argentine 
cement industry since its inception at the beginning of this century. To this 
end much of the first section is devoted to a fairly detailed account of the 
growth of each plant and firm since they first went into production. 
The relevance of this kind of approach to the analysis of technical 
efficiency and level of technology employed in a Latin American industry is wide. 
One of the striking differences between the Mexican and Argentine cement industry 
for example, is not so much differences in the kinds of technology employed, but 
the fact that the technological vanguard of the Mexican industry was quite clearly 
to be found in those firms which were subsidiaries of foreign companies. In 
contrast in the Argentine industry the technological vanguard is filled by a 
totally Argentine company which has operated for some forty odd years without 
recourse to any on going connection with foreign capital. The one foreign owned 
firm in the sector has consistently lost its market share since the second world 
war and the technology utilised at its plants is considerably less advanced than 
that employed at the Argentine owned plants referred to above. 
This is not to say that all locally owned firms in the sector operate at the 
same high level of technology and technical efficiency. Other Argentine cement 
firms operate with old and obsolete technology at levels of efficiency far below 
that of the market leaders, and below any internationally recognised standard. 
In order to understand these central facets of the Argentine cement industry 
- the demise of foreign owned plants, .and the disparate level of technology 
between different producers, it is necessary to refer to the historical path 
which is examined in this paper. 
Approached at this level the case study offers an insight into the dynamics 
of the sector which is not available in cross sectional studies which seek to 
analyse industrial sectors on a more aggregate basis. Firstly, as we have said, 
such studies ignore the specificity of individual country and historical circums-
tances which shape the context of industrial development. Secondly, they fail to 
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differentiate between the various different kinds of techniques in a broad tech-
nological mix which is not only available freely on the market, but which clearly 
exists within the sector. While the current study suffers from the disadvantage 
inherent in the fact that there are too few firms involved to represent a statis-
tically viable sample, and in some cases the quality and detail of the technical 
data available is insufficient, it does have the advantage that it is able to 
supersede the generalizations inherent in many comparative studies of industrial 
sectors. 
Another important implication of this kind of case study approach is at 
the level of policy recommendation; too many analyses of ways in which to promote 
growth and efficiency in Latin American industry ignore the fact that each firm 
is operating in competition with other firms; any policy change which results in 
the growth and improvement in the production at one firm's plant will have 
repercussions on the dynamics of other firms in the sector, given the macroecono-
mic constraints imposed by the size and rate of growth of the market, and in the 
case of intermediate goods like cement, of very limited independent price 
elasticity of demand or substitutability with other products. 
Finally, case studies of this nature are able to make an important contri-
bution to the general discussion on technology and technological dependence in 
Latin America. Much of the early discussion was formulated in the context of the 
assumption that either a country/sector produced its own capital goods, thus being 
autonomous or self sufficient in matters of technology, or it imported them from 
abroad, earning the label of technological dependent. Such view is obviously too 
simplistic to have much relevance for designing technology policies in Latin 
American countries (or elsewhere). When technology - in terms of kinds of machines 
and production control techniques, as well as modes of acquisition of that tech-
nology are analysed in detail and within, a specific context of a single sector in 
a single country it becomes clear that the fact that capital goods are imported 
from abroad does not close all the options for an independent technology policy 
and the development of internal technical capacity within the sector. In reality 
there is a wide spectrum of possibilities, which are defined by the terms of 
negotiation and purchase for new capital goods, the provision of technical 
assistance and the opportunity for real technical transfer of know-how and, in some 
cases the long term development of internal capacity sufficient to replace 
external technical assistance at various stages of technology acquisition and 
operation and the possibility of local innovation to modify and adapt imported 
technology. 
Section 1 
STRUCTURE AND GROWTH OF THE ARGENTINE CEMENT INDUSTRY 
1. Introduction 
At the end of 197 5 the Argentine cement industry comprised 17 plants which 
had a combined installed capacity of 8,650,000 tonnes per year \J. Of these 
17 plants 5 belong to the largest cement company in Argentina, Loma Negra S.A. 
and account for about 50% of installed capacity (see table 1). A further four 
plants belong to the second largest firm, CORCEMAR S.A. which account for some-
what under 20% of total capacity. The next biggest firm is the US owned Cia. 
Argentina de Cemento Portland which owns 11 1/2% of total capacity spread 
between two plants. Then comes Calera Avellaneda S.A., with a single plant 
representing nearly 10% of the national industry. The Cia. Sud Americana de 
Cemento Portland S.A. (Juan Minetti) is the smallest of the privately-owned cement 
firms in Argentina; with its three factories it owns just under 8% of the 
industry's productive capacity. There are also two publically owned cement 
plants in Argentina which account for the remaining 3% of industrial capacity. 
The Federal government has been operating a small plant in Chubut since 1952. 
More recently, at the end of 1975, another publically owned plant in San Luis 
province went into production after a long ar.i. muddled gestation period of some 
fifteen years. This plant is operated by the Provincial government of San Luis. 
The total combined production of cement in Argentina in 197 5 was 5.6 million 
metric tons, which made Argentina the third largest cement producer in Latin 
America, after Brazil (14.6 million tonnes) and Mexico (11.6 million tonnes). 
The cement industry was one of the first industries to establish itself in 
Argentina on an industrial scale using 'modern' production techniques. Various 
small-scale plants were established during the last third of the nineteenth 
century in Argentina which used small vertical kilns made in the country. Most 
of these did not survive very long and the inauguration of the modern cement 
industry in Argentina is generally acknowledged to be the establishment by a US 
cement firm of a 140,000 ton per year plant in 1915. This plant which still 
produces cement, is the Sierras Bayas Bs. As. plant of the Cia. Argentina de 
Cemento Portland. Since that date the vast majority of the subsequent cement 
plants and expansion projects in the industry have been established by local 
Argentine capital and the US owned firm now accounts for little over 10% of 
total installed capacity in the industry. 
The different growth paths of each of the five private cement companies in 
Argentina will be examined later in this section. However it is necessary to make 
a general comment about the growth of national capital in this industry and the 
relationship of that capital with the foreign suppliers of technology which, as 
we showed in Monograph One have traditionally been international firms based in 
Western Europe or, to a lesser extent, in the United States of America» 2J 
1/ Throughout this paper the abbreviation ton refers to metric ton or tonne. 
The abbreviation tpd = ton per day; and tpy = ton per year. 
2/ IDB/ECLA Research Programme in Science and Technology, Working Paper NQ. 9, 
Technology, Innovation and Transfer of Technology in the Cement Industry , Ruth 
Pearson, IDB/ECLA/BA/19, 11 Feb. 1977. (1) 
Whilst we found that in the Mexican cement industry the most advanced technology 
and the highest rate of incorporation of innovations was found in those firms 
associated with foreign capital from the European cement sector,in Argentina the 
situation is quite different. 3/ The foreign capital involved in Argentina is 
not European but American, which has traditionally been technologically backward 
in cement production compared with the European industry. And secondly, the fact 
that US capital has been in the cement industry in Argentina since 1915 is also 
relevant. While in earlier decades the US owned plant(s) may well have been the 
most technically advanced in the industry, the much faster rate of growth of the 
Argentine-owned firms which has taken place more recently than major investment 
by the US firm 4/ has enabled at least some of the Argentine firms to 
incorporate much more advanced technology than that employed in the US-owned firm 
and, with the benefit of a more far reaching and rational technology acquisition 
policy on behalf of the Argentine firms, the latter have built up an internal 
technical capacity far superior to that existing m the US—owned plants in 
Argent ina, 5/ 
2. Market shares 
Table 1 shows the structure of the Argentine Cement Industry as of December 
197 5. As indicated above Loma Negra is by far the largest firm in the sector with 
nearly 50% of installed capacity. The somewhat lower figure for share of cement 
deliveries achieved by Loma Negra in 1975 is a reflection of two factors; firstly, 
the size of its two Buenos Aires Province plants (2 million and 1.7 million tonnes 
respectively), which are much larger than the rest of the plants in the industry, 
means that high capacity utilisation is much more difficult to achieve in a 
depressive market situation such as that which occurred in Argentina since the 
beginning of 1974. Secondly, the most recent expansion projects at these two 
plants in the early seventies were completed ahead of current demand at a time 
when the demand for cement was growing very strongly. 6/ Thus these large scale 
investments made in order to meet future growth in demand have never been fully 
utilised and the firm has been forced to cut its production according to the 
vagarities of the market which were not fully foreseen at the time the investment 
3/ IDB/ECLA Research Programme in Science and Technology, Working Paper N2 
11, The Mexican Cement Industry, Technology,Market Structure and Growth, Ruth 
Pearson, IDB/ECLA/BA/21, Sept. 1977. (2) 
4/ Although the firm did expand its Sierras Bayas plant in 1971 by 250,000 
typ, this kiln was in fact a second-hand kiln from a closed-down plant in the US 
and thus did not represent the incorporation of technical innovation that a 
different kind of investment made at that time could have implied. This will be 
discussed at greater length in Sections 2 and 3 of this paper. 
_5/ This is not to say that the parent company - Lone Star Inc. does not have 
a very high technical capacity in its US plants. 
6/ Between 1969 and 1971 installed capacity in the Argentine cement industry 
grew from 5.1 million tonnes to 8.1 million, a growth of nearly 60% in two 
years. However, the demand for cement, as measured by its consumption never 
sustained its high growth rate in the late 1960s (see Graph: figure 1). 
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decision was made. 7/ However, in spite of the completion more recently of 
fairly large expansion projects by Calera Avellaneda, Corcemar and Cia. Argentina 
de Cemento Portland, there is no indication that any other firm is likely to 
challenge Loma Negra's leadership in the Argentine cement industry. 8/ 
The second biggest firm in the sector is CORCEMAR (an abbreviation of. Corpo-
ración Cementerà Argentina S.A.). This company is based in the central, region 
of the country, in the province of Cordoba where the firm originated. In 
addition to the two Cordoba plants it also operates small plants in Mendoza and 
in the Province of Buenos Aires, South East of the Metropolitan district. How-
ever the Bs. As. plant, established in 1939 has not been expanded since and it 
is rumoured that, by inter-firm agreement, CORCEMAR will not intervene any further 
in the Buenos Aires market, in exchange for an agreement from Loma Negra not to 
intervene in the Cordoba (central) regional market. 
Although it is the second biggest firm in the sector both in terms of 
installed capacity and production, CORCEMAR's total installed capacity in its 
four plants is only 1.6 million tons compared with the 4.3 million of Loma 
Negra. In 1975 CORCEMAR owned 18.4% of the total installed capacity in the 
Argentine cement industry, compared to 14.4% in 1965. Although its overall 
capacity utilisation in 1975 was better than Loma Negra's - 61% compared with 
57.6% (see table 1) the capacity utilisation at the large one million tons a year 
plant at Yocsina, Cordoba was only 54.7%, lower than the 58.5% at the 2 
million tpy plant of Loma Negra's at Olavarria. Again the partial explanation is 
that the recession hit the urban industrial centres much more sharply that smaller 
consumption centres which are not so sensitive to industrial recession; and again 
another possible element in the low production record of the plant in recent 
years is technical problems in operating the newest large kiln at the plant. 
The two plants belonging to Cia. Argentina de Cemento Portland achieved 
relatively high capacity utilisation. The smaller plant at Entre Rios, Parana, 
has always been able to sell all it produced since it is the only plant in the 
7/ There is also a possibility that the firm experienced technical 
difficulties in getting the new kilns to operate at full capacity immediately 
after they went into production. 
8/ Although all three companies mentioned have completed expansion projects 
recently (since 1970) there is no indication that their rate of growth will 
continue at the same pace. The Calera Avellaneda expansion of 500,000 tpy 
which was completed in 197 5 was the result of some ten years of struggling to 
expand the plant in the face of financial problems and a peculiar competitive 
situation (see Section 3). There are no immediate plans to expand this plant 
further or for the company to establish any new plants. The CORCEMAR expansion 
in Cordoba of the Yocsina plant which was completed in 1970 has absorbed any 
possibility of market growth in that area for the time being, and in any case it 
appears to be the policy of CORCEMAR not to compete directly with Loma Negra in 
the Buenos Aires regional market which is where most of the market potential is 
concentrated. The Cia. Argentina de Cemento Portland expansion was the first 
investment made by that company since 1958: not only are there no further 
expansion plans but it appears that the firm is running out of limestone reserves 
at least in the immediate vicinity of the Sierra Bayas plant. 
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vicinity of a large industrial centre of Santa Fe, 9/ The Sierra Bayas plant 
survived the recession more adequately than some of its Argentine competitors 
partly because a substantial proportion of its output is sold to real-estate 
companies controlled by the same group, and partly because it enjoys the customer 
loyalty of other foreign-owned multinationals in Argentina instead of being 
largely dependent on public sector building and housing programmes which were cut 
dramatically after the 1974 crisis. 
Calera Avellaneda has also maintained its market share since its new 
expansion project went into production at the end of 1974. This has been achieved 
- again by a lower reliance on public sector demand which has cushioned the firm 
from the extremities of the recession in the country. The firm also has a very 
competitive pricing structure and an established market which has not fallen 
dramatically in the recession. 
The Cordoba-based firm, Cia. Sudamericana de Cemento Portland which operates 
three fairly small plants in the provinces of Cordoba, Mendoza and Salta has 
maintained a reasonable market, except at the Mendoza plant where low production 
figures in 1975 may well be caused by labour troubles as well as obsolete 
machinery. The Salta plant has a naturally protected market which included the 
southern part of Bolivia when the price differentials make it worthwhile; in any 
case it is the only plant located in the extreme North of the country. 
The two publically-owned plants are really outside the structure of the rest 
of the industry; the Comodoro Rivadavia plant in Chubut was established mainly to 
serve the industrial pole created by oil and petroleum exploration in the province; 
to a certain extent it carries out that function although its costs have always 
been higher and its productivity lower than the rest of the industry. It is 
reported to utilise second-hand machinery and has never manufactured the special 
cements needed for oil exploration and drilling which have been supplied by the 
private sector. 
The San Luis plant was initially planned during Peron's first period of 
government and the project has been shelved and reactivated on various occasions 
during the last fifteen years. Since it only went into operation in September 
1975 it is too soon to know what kind of productivity performance it might have. 
In any case, at 1% of the total industry, it is unlikely to have a discernable 
effect on the mainstream of the Argentine cement industry. 
3. Regional structure of cement industry in Argentina 
If the cement industry in Argentina is analysed in terms of regional markets 
the hegemony of the big firms is shown to be restricted to the largest markets in 
terms of both consumption and production; the smaller, most outlying, slowest 
growing and least important regions are those where the large firms are less 
anxious to penetrate and more likely to leave the smaller firms to enjoy a local 
9/ Demand in this area in excess of the Parana plant's production is served 
by other plants in the Cordoba region. But because of the high freight cost in 
transporting cement, the Parana plant obviously enjoys a locational advantage. 
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monopoly. Table 2 shows how the industry can be divided into regional markets or 
zones, with the two most important areas, both for production and consuption 
being centres on the industrial poles of Buenos Aires Province (Zone One) and the 
Cordoba-Santa Fe-Rosario axis (Zone Two). 10/ 
If we then examine the market shares of each firm according to the regional 
structure of the industry (see tables 3, 4 and 5) we see that Loma Negra is in 
fact only the largest company in the industry's Zone One where it enjoyed a market 
share of 68% of the installed capacity of the region and 61% of the deliveries 
in 1975. Tables 3, 4 and 5 indicate that in that region Loma Negra's share of 
installed capacity has risen very slightly during the last ten years and although 
the share in deliveries shows a slight decrease in recent years, this has been 
explained above by conjunctural factors affecting the market for cement since 
1973/74. 
In Zone Two the market leader, both in terms of capacity and deliveries is 
the Cordoba based firm CORCEMAR which in 197 5 accounted for 77% of installed 
capacity in the zone and 70% of total deliveries (see table 5). This market 
share indicates a substantial growth in the scope of CORCEMAR's activities since 
1965 when its share of installed capacity in the region was only 55%; this 
increase in operations is entirely due to the expansion of the Yocsina factory in 
the Province of Cordoba which now accounts for 66% of total capacity in the region. 
These two zones together account for 83.6% of the total industry in terms 
of installed capacity (1975) and 82.6% in terms of deliveries, a proportional 
importance which has been maintained and very slightly increased during the last 
ten years. 
We cannot rule out the likelihood of an inter-firm agreement between these 
two companies not to compete with each other in these particular spheres of 
influence, (apart from the small Pipinas plant in the Province of Buenos Aires 
which has not been greatly expanded since it was established in 1939). 
In the other three zones which together account for under 20% of total 
installed capacity in the industry, the market leadership is less clear and in 
none of the cases is it exercised by either of the two largest firms referred to 
above. However, it is pertinent to note that none of the new plants established 
since the war, with the exception of the two publically-owned plants in Chubut 
and San Luis have been established by any firms other than these two market 
leaders even when they were first mooted by independent entrepreneurs. It is 
also interesting to note that, of the 3.7 million tons expansion in installed 
capacity in the Argentine industry since 1965, some 2.6 million tons, or 70% 
10/ This regional division is the one used by the Asociación de Fabricantes 
de Cemento Portland and is also used by the individual cement manufacturers in 
determining their zones of influence for the purpose of calculating the market 
penetration effects of new investments. It is however a very schematic regional-
isation and does not take into account actual flows of cement from factories to 
consumption centres. For a more detailed discussion of regional distribution in 
the Argentine cement industry and the inherent transportation costs and problems 
see: Fundación de Investigaciones Económicas Latinoamericanas, Costos marginales 
a largo plazo de transporte ferroviario y 'automotor de cargas, Libro NQ 6, 
Sección 4,"Aplicación al transporte de cemento", pp. 302-309, FIEL, mimeo, Bs. As., 
1970. 
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has been in plants owned by these two largest firms (see table 6) of which nearly 
68% has taken place in one of the two largest zones in the industry. 
Loma Negra has pursued a policy of establishing small plants in the more out-
lying regions of the country even though it has not achieved a dominating market 
share in these regions. In addition to the two new plants established (San Juan, 
1963 and Zapala,1970) both of which were taken over by Loma Negra in the gestation 
period, the company absorbed the previously independent company of COINOR at 
Frias, Santiago del Estero, in 1350. 11/ Loma Negra has steered clear of any 
investment either in the Cordoba area (Zone Two) or in the Mendoza area (Zone 
Three) where CORCEMAR's activities are centred. 12/ CORCEMAR, apart from the 
important expansion at Yocsina have not penetrated any new market areas nor have 
they successfully challenged Cia. Sudamericana de Cemento Portland's hegemony in 
the Mendoza area. 
4. Brief history of the Argentine cement industry 
As we noted above, the Argentine cement industry is now completely dominated 
by large-scale local capital in spite of the fact that the original high-technology/ 
large-scale investments were made by US capital during the first world war. The 
way in which the Argentine owned sector of the industry expanded and outstripped 
the American capital is detailed below in the section dealing with the history of 
each of the firms in the industry. Crucial to this expansion and strengthening 
of the local base of the industry is the relationship between the Argentine 
capital and the suppliers of technology to the industry. The manner in which the 
locally-owned capital in the industry has succeeded in becoming the technical 
vanguard of the industry, thus displacing the foreign-owned firm from its initial 
technical advantage over local producers is also central to an analysis of the 
development of the cement industry in Argentina and especially to the analysis of 
the technology employed in the sector and the local technical capacity, which 
forms the main object of this study. 
At the time when the first modern cement factory went into production in 
Argentina (the Sierra Bayas plant of the US owned Cia. Argentina de Cemento Port-
land in 1918) the only local cement manufactured in Argentina came from a couple 
of small-scale vertical kiln plants in the Cordoba area. During the 1920s, 
production at this plant played an important role in the national consumption of 
cement. By 1927, local production supplied one-third of total domestic 
consumption and after that year when other plants began to go into production, 
domestic production as a proportion of total cement consumption in Argentina 
increased steadily. 13/ 
11/ The Barker plant was also a new plant - put on stream in 1956; here we 
are discussing new plants outside the Zones One and Two. 
12/ The Loma Negra plant at San Juan is technically in the same zone (Three) 
but the San Juan provincial market in fact absorbs practically the whole of the 
factory's production. 
13/ See Table 8, Basic statistics on the Argentine cement industry 1913-75. 
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The new plant that went into production in 1928 was the Olavarria plant of 
the newly formed firm of Cia. Loma Negra S.'A. This was another important land-
mark in the history of the Argentine cement industry since it was the first 
Argent ine-owned plant using continuous production techniques (i.e. large scale 
rotary kilns). During the 1930's the number of cement plants operating and the 
tonnage of installed capacity grew at unprecedent rates. Between 1930 and the 
outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 eight new plants went into production 
and one small-scale existing plant was transformed into a large scale continuous 
production plant. Installed capacity increased from 511,000 tpy to 1,812,940, 
a growth rate of 15% per year. 
Of this new investment in the industry only one plant was owned by non-
Argentine capital; the rest was divided between five Argentine firms, most of 
whom were already marginally involved in the industry as small-scale cement 
producers, or as lime producers. 
The expansion of productive capacity in the 1930's was divided between the 
existing production centres - Buenos Aires Province and the Province of Cordoba 
and areas previously not part of the domestic cement industry (see figure 2). 
One plant was erected at Frias, in Santiago del Estero Province; two plants 
in Mendoza Province and one in the northern Province of Salta near the Bolivian 
border. The size of the plants varied between 35,000 tpy and 220,000 tpy 
and all machinery and equipment as well as technological know how and technical 
and managerial skills were imported, mainly from Europe but also from the United 
States. However, domestic production expanded from 412,000 tpy in 1930 to 
1,135,312 tpy in 1939 (an annual average growth rate of 11.9%) and by the out-
break of the War imports represented less than 2% of total domestic consumption 
of cement. 
This expansion of the industry which started in 1930 was mainly concentrated 
in the last half of the decade that is between 1935-1939. The major part of the 
new capacity installed in the 1930-35 period was the result of investment made 
by local capital in the Cordoba areas; 200,000 tpy of new capacity was 
installed in this central region during the 1930-35 period in response to the 
rapid urbanisation and incipient industrialisation taking place in the area. 
Expansion in other parts of the country came later, and was probably more 
directly influenced by the measures Of import control taken by the government and 
by the new possibilities of import substitution as well as by the industrialisation 
and urbanisation-linked demand which had become manifest in at least the Buenos 
Aires area prior to its inception in Cordoba. The Calera Avellaneda plant near 
Olavarria, which was owned by the German immigrant lime-producing firm of the same 
name went into production in 1935-37. In 1938 the US-owned Cia Argentina de 
Cemento Portland S.A. established its second plant on the banks of the Rio Parana 
in the Province of Entre Rios. In the same year an independent company C0IN0R 
established a plant in Frias in the Province of Santiago del Estero on the border 
with Catamarca Province. In 1939 C0RCEMAR inaugurated another new plant at 
Pipinas, South East of Buenos Aires. The other Cordoba-based company, Cia. 
Sudamericana de Cemento Portland put up a small plant at Campo Santo in Salta 
Province near the border with Bolivia, sharing with C0IN0R the market for the 
North Central area of the country. 
Although both production and capacity increased throughout the 1930's as the 
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new plants were put into operation the index of capacity Utilisation for the 
industry as a whole shows substantial falls in the years when major new investment 
was put on stream. Much of the technical capacity required to run these plants 
at a high level of capacity utilisation was provided by technical assistance of 
one form or another, mainly by the machinery suppliers in the case of the 
Argentine owned firms, and by the parent company in the case of the US-owned 
firm. Another source of technical knowledge was derived from the fact that many 
of the technically qualified employees of the cement companies were first or 
second generation European immigrants who had received their technical training 
in Europe. 
This ready supply of technical capacity, skills and knowledge from Europe, 
in its diverse forms, lessened the technological advantage of the US-owned company 
over its argentine competitors even in these comparatively early days of the 
industry. The US company also faced particular problems which limited the 
possibilities of its expansion and maintaining a dominant market position. The 
history of this firm is detailed below. 
However, although the conjunctural factors and problems with raw materials 
supplies explain the failure of this particular company, or rather of the particular 
plants owned by this company to maintain a leading role in the industry it does 
not explain why foreign capital in general has been ousted to such a large extent 
from the Argentine cement industry, especially in view of the role played by 
foreign capital in the Mexican cement industry 14/ and the importance of 
foreign investment in Argentine industry in general. 
With regards to the comparison with the Mexican industry it should be 
remembered that the foreign capital involved in Mexico, particularly that which 
we have considered to be the technological vanguard within the Mexican cement 
industry, was European, not American capital. As we showed in the first monograph 
15/ , US cement industry has been technologically behind the European industry 
both in the production of innovations in cement production and in the incorporation 
of such innovations into cement productions within the USA. Indeed, the most 
recent high-technology investments in the US cement industry 'have been carried 
out by European firms investing in the US industry. In this respect it is 
unlikely that a big US cement firm, albeit one of the larges cement corporations 
in the USA, would export to its Latin American subsidiaries the most up to date 
and efficient technology; and as we show below, opportunities for incorporating 
innovations by new investments in earlier periods have not been taken up in 
Argentina because of the uncertainty of the investment climate. In addition the 
policies of the Argentine government, until recently, regarding the importation 
and capitalisation of technology and the repatriation of profits and royalties 
have been stricter than those prevailing in Mexico, which is another factor 
likely to discourage high technology investments in this sector by the US-based 
firm. 
The development of local capital in the cement industry has also presented 
a much stronger challenge to foreign investment than was the case in Mexico. The 
majority of the Argentine firms that have taken over the cement industry in the 
14/ See R. Pearson, 1977 (2), op. cit. 
15/ See R. Pearson, 1977 (1), op. cit. 
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country have been firms whose initial business ventures were connected with the 
traditional Argentine enterprises of cattle rearing and meat exporting. This 
connection between 'agro-industry' and cement production have given local 
entrepreneurs several advantages. Firstly they have had the opportunity to 
obtain access to the necessary capital investment for cement production, either 
from accumulated reserves or collateral provided by their other businesses. 
Secondly, and particularly in the case of the competitors of Cia. Argentina de 
Cemento Portland in the Olavarria region, they have ownership of land reserves -
either originally acquired for ranches or bought specifically with cement 
production in mind. Thirdly, they have had some business experience and 
connections before undertaking this venture. And fourthly, the majority of the 
entrepreneurs who were successful in the meat production business and all of those 
who later went into cement production were first generation European immigrants 
of professional families some of whom had even enjoyed technical education at 
well known European technical institutes. In this sense they were acquainted 
with technical progress in industrial innovations in European industries; they 
were familiar with the sources of technology for the industry and were easily 
able to visit those sources and acquire the necessary technology for their new 
industrial projects. So the US firm in fact had no intrinsec advantage over its 
local competitors in this sector; the normal advantages accruing to foreign 
capital in underdeveloped countries - access capital, access to technology, 
technically trained manpower and entrepreneurial experience were equally if not 
more so available to the Argentine businessmen as to the officials of the US 
firm with whom they were competing. The Argentines moreover had the advantage 
of being nationals which gave them security in times when the nationalistic policy 
of the Argentine government made investment prospects for foreign capital insecure. 
Their national status also gave them access to government contracts, especially 
important during the primary industrialisation phase of the country's development 
when most of the industrial and social infrastructure was being constructed. 
Of course not all the Argentine entrepreneurs fared equally well as the 
brief history of those firms given below will indicate; while the vanguard of the 
industry is considered amongst the most technically advanced in Latin America and 
North America, there are still one or two small plants which have survived using 
very outdated and inefficient technology in spite of the rapid concentration in 
the industry. But the firms which have prospered have not been hindered by 
limitations imposed on the access to new innovations in production which has 
affected the survival of Argentine firms in the manufacturing industry in Argentina; 
nor in this sector is consumer prejudice and brand loyalty a problem. 
5. History of growth of firms in Argentine cement industry 
Loma Negra S.A. 
The leading firm in the cement sector in the post war period is the Buenos 
Aires based company: Loma Negra S.A. This firm began life as an agricultural 
enterprise in the 1920's whose activities included stock breeding, cattle farming 
and lime production. In 1926 the first cement factory was projected on land 
owned by the firm near Olavarria in the Province of Buenos Aires, to complement 
its other activities. This plant, which is still the largest Loma Negra plant 
began production of cement in 1928 with an installed capacity of 150,000 tpy. 
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Soon afterwards the agricultural and farming activities of the company were 
separated from those pertaining to cement and lime production, the latter keeping 
the company name of Loma Negra. 
The family which owned this complex of companies was the Fortabat family of 
Basque immigrants who had settled in the division of Azul in the Province of 
Buenos Aires. The director of the company, known as Don Alfredo Fortabat until 
his death in 1975 was born in Argentina, but had in fact received a technical 
education at the Ecole Superieur in Paris. Although the extent of the family 
business at the time that cement production was initiated in 1928 is not known, 
the family continued to be associated with farming and stock breeding in the area 
and accumulated vast amounts of highly profitable agricultural land as well as 
the raw materials reserves for the limestone and aggregate quarries. 
As we noted earlier in this section, the land around Olavarria is 
particularly suitable for cement production and this factory prospered from the 
beginning. By 1936 the capacity had been increased to 260,000 tpy and by .1946 
rated capacity at the plant was 450,000 tpy, which was about the same size as 
the neighbouring US owned factory at that date. 
A fifth kiln was added in 1956 bringing the installed capacity to 600,000 
tpy which made this the largest plant in the Argentine cement industry to date. 
While the Olavarria plant was not further expanded until 1963 when a sixth kiln 
brought its installed capacity up to 1,000,000 tpy, Loma Negra was expanding at 
other locations. 
In approximately 1950 Loma Negra bought out the Frias plant of C0IN0R (Com-
pañia Industrial Norteña de Cemento) in the Province of Santiago del Estero. This 
plant which was established in 1938, was a 120,000 tpy wet process installation, 
had begun to manufacture white cement on the basis of a patent acquired from a 
French company, but this was discontinued in 1948 because of problems of acquiring 
an adequate fuel supply. Wheter these problems were general to all cement 
production is not really known but the negotiations with Loma Negra for the take 
over commenced shortly afterwards and were completed by the end of 1950. 
In the immediate post-war period no new investment was made in Argentina. 
However,as soon as imports of capital goods and exchange restrictions began to be 
lifted in the mid fifties, major new capacity was installed. A new Loma Negra 
plant at Barker near Tandil, Province of Buenos Aires went into production in 
1956, with a rated capacity up to just over one million tons per year, or 38% 
of total installed capacity in the industry at that date. 
The next period of rapid growth for the firm, as for the industry in general 
was the early 1960's. in 1963 major expansion came on stream at both the Olava-
rria plant and the Barker plant; at the former a sixth kiln was installed 
increasing capacity to 1 million tpy and at Barker a second kiln, with a 
capacity of 730,000 tpy increased total capacity at the plant to 1.2 million 
tons making this plant the largest in the country. 
A fourth Loma Negra plant went into operation in 1963 - the San Juan plant 
whose initial investment had been organised by a commercial company called Compañía 
Industrial San Juanina S.A.. However, some months before the 125,000 tpy plant 
went into production in March 1963, a management and technical contract was 
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awarded to Lorna Negra which became responsible for all aspects of production, 
administration and sales and the cement produced was marketed under the Lorna Ne-
gra brand name. Lorna Negra's share participation in the company was 
consistently increased and by 1973 the Cia. Industrial San Juanina ceased to 
exist and the plant became known as the San Juan factory of Lorna Negra. 
After these three major investments the combined capacity of Lorna Negra's 
plants in 1963 was 2.3 million tons a year, which represented 4-7% of total 
industry capacity. 
During the remainder of the 1960's, minor increments to capacity were made 
at the various plants belonging to the firm. The early 1970's saw another round 
of major expansions and new investments in the industry, and as we noted earlier 
in the paper, Lorna Negra shared proportionately in this round of increases. 1970, 
like 1963 saw two new Lorna Negra expansion projects come on stream as well as the 
inauguration of another new factory which like the San Juan factory had been 
originally organised by a separate industrial concern, but had ceded technical 
and administrative control to Lorna Negra shortly before the plant went into 
production. 
The major expansion projects were at the two Buenos Aires plants belonging 
to the company. A new kiln and complete production line was inaugurated at the 
Olavarria plant, doubling installed capacity at that plant to 2 million tonnes 
a year. The Barker plant was expanded by the addition of a further kiln with a 
capacity of 500,000 tpy which went on stream in 1971. 
The new plant which went into production in 1970 was the Zapala plant in 
Neuquen Province which was organised by the Cementerà Patagonica whose principal 
shareholder was the firm of Perez Companc. The motivation for the establishment 
of this plant in the Southern province of Neuquen was the expected demand 
generated by the construction of two big hidroelectrical projects, El Chocon and 
Cerros Colorados. However,in the gestation period of the plant's design and 
construction which was initiated in the early 1960's the company negotiated a 
technical and management contract with Lorna Negra, which became effective in July 
1969 some ten months before production began at the plant. 
Initially Lorna Negra held a minority proportion of the share capital in the 
company even though the direction of the factory was fully integrated into the 
overall management of the company's other plants and the cement was marketed 
under the Lorna Negra brand name. However, the participation has been continuously 
increased, and although it is not known whether total share ownership will 
eventually be achieved, Lorna Negra enjoys financial as well as administrative 
and technical control over the plant's operations. 
In this way the firm Lorna Negra has expanded its activities in the cement 
industry from the small plant which began production in Olavarria in 1928. Although 
the company was not backed by foreign capital with technical capacity and 
experience in the cement industry it has become by far the largest and most 
important firm in the industry, and has established a solid technical capacity 
on the basis of incorporation of new innovations in the experimental stage as well 
as a conscious policy of lessening reliance on machinery suppliers for elements 
of technical capacity which it is possible to build up internally. This will be 
discussed in Section 4 of this paper. 
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CORCEMAR S.A. 
The second largest and most important firm in the Argentine cement industry-
is the Cordoba based firm of CORCEMAR (Corporación Cementerà Argentina S.A.). 
This firm had its origins as a small plant established in Cordoba during the first 
world war by two European immigrants, engineers employed by the Department of 
Public Works of the Municipality of Cordoba. Production at this plant, which is 
known as the Kilometro 7 plant was initiated in a vertical kiln with a rated 
capacity of 16 tons a day; because of the difficulties in importing equipment 
caused by the war all the plant was manufactured in the locality, and apparently 
continued functioning into the late 1930's. In 1934 the two original owners of 
the plant formed a company with other local capital in order to expand cement 
production at the Cordoba plant and in this way the Corporación Cementerà Argen-
tina was founded. In 1932 the vertical kilns were transported to Mendoza to be 
used for lime manufacture and a-new rotary kiln, with a capacity of 42,000 tpy 
was imported from the US; a second rotary kiln with a similar capacity was 
imported from Germany in 1934 bringing total capacity at the plant to 84,000 tpy. 
Shortly afterwards, in 1936, cement production was initiated by CORCEMAR in 
Mendoza at the Capdeville plant where a lime plant had already been established. 
This plant also had an initial capacity of 42,000 tpy which was doubled shortly 
afterwards. 
CORCEMAR established a third plant shortly before the outbreak of the second 
world war in 1939. This was the Pipinas plant in Buenos Aires Province which went 
into production with an initial capacity of about 200,000 tpy. 
Thus by the outbreak of the second world war, which marked the end of a 
period of rapid expansion in the Argentine cement industry, CORCEMAR's total 
capacity was about 3 50,000 tpy which represented nearly 20% of total domestic 
capacity. 16/ 
CORCEMAR, in common with the rest of the Argentine cement industry was 
unable to expand its capacity at any of its plants until import restrictions were 
eased in the mid 1950's. New kilns at both the Kilometro 7, Cordoba plants and 
the Capdeville plants went on stream during the 1957/59 period bringing the 
respective capacities at these plants up to 165,000 and 175,000 tpy 
respectively. 
The most important expansion by CORCEMAR in the more recent period was the 
establishment of a new plant just outside the city of Cordoba at Yocsina in 1964. 
This plant, whose initial capacity was 260,000 tpy was partly motivated by the 
fact that it was impossible to expand the company's Kilometro 7 plant any 
further since the process of urban growth in Cordoba has meant that the Kilometro 7 
factory, originally sited near one of the railway terminals at the outskirts of 
the City is now in the middle of an urban area with no physical possibility of 
expansion at the site of the plant. 
16/ In spite of the fact that initial and subsequent capacity figures are 
given for these plants it is not clear whether these are estimates or represent 
the real potential producing capacity of these plants. For this reason it is not 
claimed that capacity totals given here are anything more than approximate estimates. 
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The new plant at Yocsina was expanded in 1971 so that its total capacity is 
now 940,000 tpy. 17/ This means that apart from being the biggest plant 
belonging to CORCEMAR it is also the biggest, and most up to date plant outside 
the Buenos Aires Zone of influence; since, as we established above, the market 
for cement is divided regionally in such a way that there is no direct 
competition between the Buenos Aires Zone and the Cordoba Zone, this Yocsina 
plant is able to exercise considerable hegemony over its competitors in the region. 
As Table 6 indicates, CORCEMAR1s share of national capacity increased from 
15.6% in 1965 to 18.4% in 1975; replacing Cia. Argentina de Cemento Portland as 
the country's second largest cement firm. In terms of production the share of 
CORCEMAR cement in total deliveries made by the industry was slightly higher than 
the proportion of total capacity (19.7% in 1975 - see table 7); however in both 
installed capacity and deliveries it is clear that CORCEMAR has established itself 
as the second most important firm in the sector on the basis of its almost total 
domination of the Cordoba region, which is the second most important industrial 
area and market in Argentina. 
The growth of CORCEMAR until it has become the second largest firm in the 
sector is a consequence of several factors. Its initial success was owed to the 
fact that its founding partners were qualified engineers who had been employed by 
the Municipalidad de Cordoba to inspect the quality of domestically produced and 
imported cement used in public works in the city; thus the engineers were familiar 
with the properties of cement and had the opportunity to learn the process of 
production before risking their capital in the venture. 
The distance between the Buenos Aires Province plants and the Cordoba area 
was a source of natural protection for the Cordoba plant in the early period. In 
more recent times it has also served to separate the two markets; since the 
Cordoba based CORCEMAR was firmly established in the region before Loma Negra or 
any of the other Bs. As. plants were in a position to challenge its market 
dominance in the region, a policy of mutual non-interference was undoubtedly 
profitable to both parties. 18/ 
The particular nature of the Cordoba market - both protected from intra-
regional competition and yet constituting a large and growing demand for cement 
has enabled CORCEMAR to increase its capacity and, to a certain degree incorporate 
in its newest investments large-scale and sophisticated technical innovations in 
process technology. Because of its secure market and growth prospects it has had 
no difficulty in raising international or local credit and thus the incorporation 
of new innovation has been carried out very much by technical assistance from 
machinery suppliers and others rather than on the basis of building up the 
company's own internal technical capacity. 
17/ The figure quoted by the company to the Asociación de Fabricantes de 
Cemento-Portland is in fact 1 million tpy. 
18/ The fact that the CORCEMAR capital was raised entirely from local 
sources is also relevant here. Since cement production requires raw material 
sources it is unlikely that the Buenos Aires based firms were able to obtain 
access to raw materials which of course implied land ownership. 
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Cía. Argentina de Cemento Portland 
The firm of Cia. Argentina de Cemento Portland, the fully-owned US subsidiary, 
was the first firm in the country to initiate cement production on a continuous 
basis (i.e. using Rotary kilns instead of vertical kilns). This first plant 
which began production in 1919, had an initial production capacity of about 
60,000 tpy and was built entirely from US manufactured equipment. This firm was 
a subsidiary of the US firm International Cement Corporation when it founded the 
Argentine company in 1915. The parent company later merged with a Texan cement 
firm and in 1936 changed its name to the Lone Star Cement Corporation. 19/ 
Production at this plant expanded through the 1920's and installed 
capacity at the plant reached 180,000 tpy in 1927. By this date the plant 
contributed practically all the country's domestically produced cement which 
accounted for over one third of total consumption. 
The factory was apparently run entirely by US management and technical 
personnel and proved very profitable for the parent company; during the first 
ten years of the plant's life while the company had the virtual monopoly of 
sales of domestically produced cement (apart from the Small Cordoba plants which 
in fact did not penetrate to the Buenos Aires market) it was able to remit to 
its parent company a sum equal to the total capital invested in the 1916-1928 
period. 
This plant was undoubtedly the inspiration which induced local entrepreneurs 
to set up cement plants in Argentina, especially in the limestone rich area 
around Olavarria where the American plant was established. 20/ 1930-1939 was 
an important growth period in the Argentine cement industry and the US company 
participated with other firms in this growth. A fifth kiln was added to the 
Sierra Bayas plant in the mid-thirties but the major new investment by the firm 
was the establishment of a new plant at Parana, Province of Entre Rios, which 
went on stream in 1938. This new plant had an initial capacity of 146,000 tpy 
(the same as its present capacity and represented the incorporation of a very 
advanced production technique) (see Section 2 below). 
The war period and the rest of the 1940's and early 1950's were a period 
of consolidation rather than expansion for the cement industry in Argentina; new 
investment was virtually halted by the difficulty of obtaining imported capital 
goods and the restrictions on foreign exchange. Fuel shortages and transportation 
difficulties cut the production of many plants. 
19/ More recently, in 1969 it became Lone Star Industries Inc. to reflect 
the diversification of its interests out of exclusively cement related activities 
(see Moody's Industrial Director 1973). 
20/ The plant referred to is the Cia. Argentina de Cemento Portland plant 
at Sierra Bayas, near Olavarria, Buenos Aires Province. In fact, there are now 
three plants adjacent to each other at this particular location - the Calera Ave-
llaneda plant and the original Loma Negra plant. The area is particularly 
attractive for cement manufacture because of the quality of the limestone found 
there. 
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In the middle of the 1950's the industry began to expand again and the 
American-owned plant at Sierra Bayas added a sixth kiln to the plant increasing 
capacity by 500 tons a day (165,000 tons a year) to a total of 585,000 tpy. 
The only further new investment made at the plant is the latest expansion of a 
700 tpd (220,000 tpy) production line which went on stream in 1970 bringing 
capacity at that plant up to its current 845,000 tpy. 
The explanation as to why the US-owned firm has failed to expand at the 
same rate as the rest of the industry and why it has ceded the dominant market 
position to the locally owned firm is complex. One reason given for the failure 
of this firm to maintain its market share is that a policy decision to curb its 
domestic envolvement was reportedly taken by the US directors during Peron's 
first government when the climate for foreign investors was hostile. In addition 
the Lone Star Cement Corporation suffered the loss of its Cuban plant which was 
nationalised without compensation in 1963, making the firm less amenable to 
risk - taking in an insecure investment situation. There is also a further 
aspect: major expansion at the Sierra Bayas plant is now hampered by the 
exhaustion of raw materials. Reserves are currently very low, after continuous 
exploitation of the quarries for nearly 60 years and the plant is going to have 
to start using another quarry in the near future at some 8 km. distance from 
the plant; because of the structure of land ownership in the Province of Buenos 
Aires and the competition for land usage from the highly profitable business of 
cattle rearing it is unlikely that the firm can now secure suitable raw material 
sources on a long term basis; such forward investment would have had to have been 
made in the 1940's when all available land was purchased: and it was just at 
this time that the firm was least sure of the possibilities of continuing 
operations in Argentina. 
The Parana plant is also unlikely to be expanded even though it has been 
operating for many years at full capacity. Again the problem is raw material 
supplies. The limestone utilised at the Parana plant has a low calcium carbonate 
content and contains fossilised deposits. The raw material has to be put through 
a special process (flotación) to eliminate the silicon and to increase the CaCo3 
content, which makes the costs of production relatively high. In addition to 
these problems with the quality of the raw materials the reserves belonging to 
the company are very low and although the firm has undertaken studies to try to 
locate more plentiful and better sources of raw materials in the area, it has 
apparently had little success. 21/ 
Calera Avellaneda 
This firm whose single plant now represents 10% of total installed 
21/ Information about the firm Cia. Argentina de Cemento Portland S.A. 
comes from the following sources: a) Raul Dante Verzini,"Pasado, presente y 
futuro de la industria cemento portland en la Argentina',' in Revista de la 
Unión Industrial Argentina, May/June I960; b) interview with company officials 
both at the Buenos Aires offices and at the Siems Bayas plant; c) various 
issues of the Anuario of the Asociación de Fabricantes de Cemento Portland 1945-
1975; d) "Analysis of Raw Material Distribution", Annex to La industria cemen-
terà nacional, Banco Industrial de la República Argentina, Dirección General de 
"Desarrollo Industrial, Departamento de Estudios Técnicos, Bs. As. 1961. 
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capacity in the industry was founded in 1919 by a group of German immigrants, 
whose purpose was the manufacture of lime and allied building products. The 
original lime plant, which is still extant, is on the same site as the cement 
plant established some twenty years later near Olavarria, close to the Cia. Argen-
tina de Cemento Portland and the Loma Negra plants that are sited in that area. 
In 1933 the directorate of the company decided to go into cement production, 
no doubt influenced by the two successful factories operating beside the lime 
plant. Cement production was initially carried out in two of the six vertical 
kilns possessed by the firm for lime production. However, technical difficulties 
with the production process induced the company to abandon this method of 
manufacture and in 193 5 the decision was made to import rotary kilns from Europe 
with the aim of initiating large-scale high technology cement production at the 
plant. The first rotary kiln belonging to this company, a 300 tpd Lepol kiln 
went into production at the site in 1938/39 and is still used for cement 
production by the firm. 
Calera Avellaneda, like other cement plants, was unable to expand production 
during the war and immediate post war period. In addition to the problem 
suffered in common with other cement firms - the impossibility of obtaining 
spare parts from abroad, let alone new capital equipment, shortage of fuel and 
packaging materials and other essential inputs - Calera Avellaneda suffered 
additional restrictions related to the nationality of its directors and shareholders. 
At some stage during the war, in the immediate post war period, the control of the 
firm was placed in Public hands. However the control of the firm was later 
returned to private hands and the directors and shareholders regularised their 
position by adopting Argentine nationality. 
Further expansion at the plant did not take place until 1958 when a second 
kiln went on stream. This was a 500 tpd Humboldt kiln which brought total 
capacity at the plant up to 280,000 tpy. 
Calera Avellaneda cement has had a high reputation for quality and 
reliability and the firm therefore planned a further expansion to take advantage 
of the pressure of demand which again was threatening to overtake supplies by 
the mid 1960's. However, this expansion project, first discussed within the 
company in the early 1960's was delayed for various years due to the intervention 
of interests allied to the firmfe main competitors who were trying to impede the 
expansion of Calera Avellaneda in the Buenos Aires Region. Eventually a 
substantial loan was negotiated with the International Finance Corporation of the 
World Bank, impediments to the project were legally overruled and the project 
went ahead in the early 1970's. The new plant which consists of the addition 
of a 1,000 tpy Humboldt kiln, went on stream in November 1974. Total productive 
capacity at this plant is now 845,000 tpy, making it the fourth largest plant 
in the Argentine cement industry (jointly with the Sierra Bayas plant of Cia. 
Argentina de Cemento Portland). Production at the expanded plant has continued 
at high capacity utilisation and although in 1975 Calera Avellaneda only 
represented under 10% of total cement capacity in Argentina, its contribution 
to sales was 11.3%. 
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Cia. Sudamericana de Cemento Portland S.A. (Juan Minetti) 
This is the smallest of the privately owned cement companies in Argentina, 
and the least dynamic company in terms of growth rates, maintenance of market 
share, level of technology and development of internal technical capacity. How-
ever during the 1930's this firm was one of the fastest growing and, outside the 
Buenos Aires area, the biggest of the Argentine owned cement firms, having 
established three plants before the beginning of the second world war. 
The first cement plant established by this company was the Dumesnil factory 
in the province of Cordoba which commenced production in 1930. The capital behind 
this factory came from the Minetti family, Italian immigrants who had established 
a pasta factory in the area and had acquired some quarries in the late 1920's with 
the aim of working them for lime production. However, it was decided to go into 
cement production and the Dumesnil factory equipped with rotary kilns imported 
from Europe had an initial capacity of 400 tpd. This capacity was increased by 
the addition of a second kiln in 1939 bringing the total capacity up to 600 tpd. 
The second Cia. Sud Americana de Cemento Portland factory was the Panqueua 
plant in the Province of Mendoza which went into production in 1936. The initial 
capacity at this plant was 100 tpd (30,000 tpy). A few years after its 
inauguration it was expanded and by 1939 its capacity had increased to 300 tpd 
(100,000 tpy). 
The third Minetti cement factory to be established was the Campo Santo 
factory in the Province of Salta, near the border, with Bolivia. This plant, which 
was put on stream in 1938 had an initial capacity of 200 tpd (60,000 tpy). 
Thus, by the outbreak of world war in 1939 Cia. Sud Americana de Cemento 
Portland was operating three cement plants with a combined productive capacity of 
1,100 tpd (365,000 tpy), which represented 20% of total installed capacity in 
the Argentine cement industry at this time. While none of the firm's factories 
was in the major production/consumption Zone centred on Buenos Aires, the Cordoba 
and Mendoza zones were important areas, both industrially and politically and 
Minetti's company was regarded as the most important cement manufacturing 
establishment outside the metropolitan region. 
However, since the war the factories of Cia. Sud Americana de Cemento 
Portland have not participated in a proportionate manner in the expansion of the 
rest of the industry. According to the figures published in the Annuario of the 
Asociación de Fabricantes de Cemento Portland two of the three factories were 
reducing capacity during the immediate post war period; in 1948 the Dusmenil 
factory had a rated capacity of only 250 tpd compared with a prewar 600 tpd 
estimate. The Panqueua factory was reported at 37 5 tpd and the Salta factory 
at 250 tpd. It is not clear whether these reduction in rated capacity reflect 
a realistic assessment of actual cement producing capacity, given post war 
conditions of fuel, packaging and transport shortages or whether they represent 
some rationalisation or modernisation carried out by the firm. In any case, by 
1956 all three factories were reported to have achieved their pre war capacity 
levels. Marginal increments to capacity were reported throughout the rest of the 
1950's and the beginning of the 1960's. 
The most significant expansion carried out by the firm in the post war 
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period was the addition of extra kilns to the Salta plant which increased 
capacity at this plant in 1963 from the previous 60,000 tpy figure to the 
present capacity of 235,000 tpy. 
The most recent expansion was the expansion project carried out in the 
Mendoza plant in 1972 which increased capacity there by 150,000 tpy to its 
current level of 340,000 tpy. 
The current combined capacity of the firm's three plants is 776,000 tpy 
which represents only 9% of total industry capacity, a clear decrease from its 
pre war position, and even from the 12% of total industry capacity which the 
three factories comprised in 1965. 
The firm has apparently been attempting to establish a new plant in the 
Province of Cordoba at Malagueño. However, in spite of various potential 
arrangements with machinery suppliers and international financial institutions 
the project has never come to fruition-, either because of the failure of the firm 
to adopt a 'modern' approach to investment finance, or because of the opposition 
of competitors which has been reflected in government policy. Certainly the 
factories belonging to this company are amongst the most obsolete of the whole 
cement industry in Argentina in terms of the technology employed and the 
efficiency as reflected in the technical parameters. (See Section 2 below). 
The two remaining plants in the industry are the publically owned plants at 
Comodoro Rivadavia, Province of Chubut and the newly inaugurated San Luis plant 
of El Gigante. The Chubut plant went into production in 1952. It was first 
established under the auspices of the State petrochemical corporatiom Petro-
química EN since which time the government body responsible for its administration 
has changed. The latest information available indicates that the Dirección Nacio-
nal de Industrias del Estado (DINIE) is the umbrella organisation to which the 
cement factory corresponds. 
This factory was established by the government in order to supply the 
demand which was predicted in the Southern region arising out of the oil 
exploration and subsequent industrial and urban development in the area. In fact 
the factory, which has expanded in 1968 from 120,000 tpy to 168,000 tpy has 
only partially supplied that market and much of the ordinary cement demand as 
well as the special purpose cements are supplied by the private sector. The plant 
is apparently an out of date wet process plant which is technically inefficient. 
This fact, added to the extreme geographical isolation of the factory and the 
subsequent high transport costs both of inputs and of the finished product has 
meant that the plant has consistently operated at a higher cost structure than 
other firms in the industry and has been allowed to charge higher prices than 
those prevailing in the rest of the sector. For this reason, as well as the 
small size of the plant and its distance from the major production and consumption 
centres of the industry the Chubut plant has remained marginal to the mainstream 
of developments and competition in the Argentine cement industry. 
The other publically-owned plant in the industry is the 100,000 tpy plant 
at San Luis which went into production at the end of 197 5. This plant is also 
extremely small and in most senses marginal to the mainstream of the Argentine 
cement industry. The plant has had a somewhat longer than average gestation 
period; the idea of establishing a cement plant at the El Gigante site was first 
proposed in 1960 when the Governor of the Province of San Luis actually laid the 
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foundation stone of the new plant. However, the project which was to be 
equipped with machinery imported from Czechoslovakia was continuously delayed 
even after the major items of machinery and equipment had been imported into the 
country by the mid sixties. ¿The project was apparently revitalised in 1974 and 
the final stages of the plant installation were completed over a 16 month 
period. The plant finally went into production in March 1975. 
However, with a total capacity of 100,000 tpy this plant, based as it is 
on a plant design and equipment manufactured some 10 years ago is clearly not 
in the technical vanguard of the industry. 
The discussion of the technical capacity and technology utilised in the 
Argentine cement industry will therefore be based on the plants in the privately 
owned part of the industry which comprises 97% of the total installed capacity 
and nearly 98% of the production of cement in the country. Reference will only 
be made to the State-owned plants where specific details are relevant to the 
points under discussion or when the past and potential development of the 
industry requires that the existing mixed industry structure be taken into account. 
6. Differences between Argentina and Mexican cement industries 
The Argentine cement industry in the mid seventies consists of five private 
companies or groups of companies, with the addition of two publically-owned 
factories comprising not more than 3% of total capacity. The private companies 
demonstrate an unequal distribution of the market between the different firms, 
which is the result of the way the industry has developed since the 1930's when 
the domestic osment industry in Argentina expanded rapidly to supply the growing 
market and replace imported cement. Two facts of the growth process are most 
important for our analysis; firstly that local capital has expanded and, while not 
eliminating foreign capital altogether, has ensured that the vast part of the 
expansion of the industries has taken place under the control of Argentine capital 
leaving the US owned firm already established in the industry, to a residual, if 
not marginal role. Secondly, the uneven growth of the individual firms in the 
industry is the result of the underlying oligopolistic tendencies in the industry 
related to technical conditions such as economies of scale and economies of multi-
plant operations, and to the regional concentration of demand and production 
possibilities in Argentina. This concentration and unequal growth of the industry 
has affected and is affected by the level of technology employed in the different 
firms - with the largest, fastest growing firms using the most up to date 
technology and having the opportunity to develop their own internal technical 
capacity. 
So although the industry in Argentina differs from the Mexican situation 
where the technical vanguard of the industry was located in those firms with the 
closest connection to foreign capital, the locally dominated Argentine cement 
industry presents as differentiated a picture of technological level and technical 
capacity as the Mexican industry. This is partly explained by the different pace 
of investment in the various Argentine firms as the result of the different growth 
patterns described in this first section of the paper. However, as the subsequent 
analysis of technology employed and technology acquisition will demonstrate the 
relationship between the Argentine firms and their foreign technology suppliers 
are the channels via which potential differences in technology and technical 
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capacity in the firms are materialised. 
The remainig sections of this paper deal with the level of technology 
employed in the Argentine cement industry, the pattern and policy of technology 
acquisition from suppliers of machinery and equipment, and the development of 
internal technical capacity in the firms. 
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Table 1 - The Argentine cernent ir.dustry 1975 
(tonnes per voir ar.d percenta%es)' 
Company and plant Installed capacity Deliveries a/ 
Installed capacity 
as % cf total ' 
capacity 
Deliveries 




LOMA NEGRA S.A. 4,270,000 
1. Olavarria.Bs. As. 2,000,000 
2. Barker.Bs. As. 1,700,000 
3. Zapala, Neuquen 200,000 
4. San Juan, San Juan 190,000 
5. Frías, Sgo. del Est. 180,000 
C0RCEMAR 1,595,000 
1. Yocsina, Cordoba lJOOO.OOO 
2. Pipinas, Bs. As. • 220,000 
3. Capdeville, Mendoza 210,000 
4. Kilometro 7, Cordoba 165,000 
CIA. ARGENTINA DE 
CEMENTO PORTLAND S.A. 991,000 
1. Sierras Bayas, Bs. As. 845,000 

























































CIA. SUD AMERICANA DE 
CEMENTO PORTLAND 
JUAN MINETTI S.A. 776,000 
1. Panqueua, Mendoza 340,000 
2. Dumesnil, Cordoba 202,000 
3. Campo Santo, Salta 234,000 
CALERA AVELLAHEDA 845,000 
1. Villa Carlos von 
Bernard, Olavarrla, 
Bs. As. 845,000 
FEDERAL STATE FACTORY 168,000 
1. Conodoro Rivadavia, 
Chubut 168,000 
PROVINCIAL STATE FACTORY 100,000 







































TOTAL INDUSTRY '8,650,000 5,481,121 100.0 100.0 67.2 
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Table 2 - Regional distribution of capacity, production and consumption 
in the Argentine cement industry, 1975 




Thousand % of 
tons total 
Production a/ 
Thousand % of 
tons total 
Consumption 
Thousand % of 
tons total 
REGION I 5,715 66.1-
Buenos Aires 5,515 6t.5 
Federai Capital 
La Pampa 



















REGION II 1,513 17.7 967 12.6 1,102 20.1 
Cordoba 1,367 16.0 827 15.1 508 ' 9.7 
Santa Fe 712 7.8 
Entre Rios 146 1.7 140 2,5 116 2.2 
Corrientes 35 0.7 
Misiones 31 0.6 
REGION III 840 9.2 548 10.0 467 8.9 
Mendoza 550 6.4 359 6.5 295 . 5.6 
San Juan 190 2.2 143 2.6 135 2.5 
San Luis 100 1.1 46 0.8 37 0.7 
REGION IV 414 4.8 309 5.6 551 19,5 
Salta 234 2.2 150 2.7 93 1.8 
Ju juy 65 1.2 
La Rioja 35 0.7 
Chaco 80 1.5 
Formosa 7 0.1 
Santiago del Estero 180 2.1 159 2.9 116 2.2 
Catamarca 28 0.5 
Tucumin 127 2.4 
REGION V 168 1.9 92 1.8 136 2.6 
Chubut 93 1.8 
Santa Cruz 32 0.7 
Malvinas Isles/ 
Tierra del Fuego 6 0.1 
T O T A L 8,550 100.0 5,481 100.0 5,249 100.0 
Source: Anuario de la Asociación de Fabricantes de Cemento Portland, Buenos Aires, .1975. 
. a/ Delivery figures are used to indicate production 
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Table 3 - Market shares of firms according to regional markets, 1975 
(tonnes and percentages) 
Zone 
^ ^ Firm Tonnes 
Capacity 
% Zone % Country Tonnes 
Deliveries 
% Zone % Country 
ZONE ONE 5,212,000 100.0 66.1 3¿561,252 100.0 65.0 
















Corcemar 220,000 3.8 131.697 3.7 
. Pipinas 220,000 3.8 131,697 3.7 
Cia. Argentina de 
Cemento Portland 845,500 14.8 639,955 18.0 
Sierras Bayas 845,500 14.8 639,955 18.0 
Calera Avellaneda 750,000 13.1 620.382 17.6 
Villa Carlos Von 
Bernard 750,000 13.1 620,382 17.6 
ZONE TWO 1,513,000 100,0 17.5. 966,598 100,0 . 17.6 











Cia. Argentina de 
Cemento Portland 1^6,000 9.6 160,079 14.5 
ParanS 146,000 9.6 160,079 14.5 
Cia. Sud Americana 202,000 13.4 154,952 16.0 
Dumesnil 202,000 13.4 154,952 16.0 
ZONE THREE 840,000 100.0 9.2 548,606 100.0 10.0 
Loma Hegra 190-, 000 22.6 143,492 26.2 
San Juan 190,000 22.6 143,492 26.2 
Corcemar 210,000 25.0 169,568 30.9 
.Capdeville 210,000 25.0 169,568 30.9 
Cia. Sud Americana 340,000 40.5 189,765 34.6 
Panqueua 340,000 40.5 189,765 34.6 
State Factory .100,000 11.9 45,781 8.3 
San Luis 100,000 11.9 45,781 8.3 
ZONE FOUR 414,000 100.0 4.8 308,069 100.0 5.6 
Loma Negra 180,000 40.5 148,838 48.3 
Frias 180,000 40.5 148,838 48.3 
Cia. Sud Americana 234,000 56.5 159,231 51.7 
Caropo Salta 234,000 56.5 159,231 51.7 
ZONE FIVE 168,000 100.0 1.9 96,596 100.0 1.8 
State Factory 168,000 100.0 96,596 100.0 
Comodoro Rivadavia 168,000 100.0 96,596 100.0 
INDUSTRY TOTAL 8,650,000 100.0 5,481,121 100.0 
Source: Anuario de la Asociación do Fabricantes de Cemento Pprtland, Euenos Aires, 1975. 
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Table 4 - Market shares of firms according to regional markets, 1970 
(tonnes and percentages) 
Zone _ — " 
" Firm Tonnes 
Capacity • 
% Zone % Country Tonnes 
Deliveries 
•% Zone % Country 
ZONE ONE U,90S,000 100.0 65.3 3,153,197 X O O . O 66. S 
















Corcemar 220,000 X.6 153,053 4.9 
Pipinas 220,000 4.6 153,0S3 4.9 
Cia. Argentina de 
Cemento Portland 8X5,000 12.6 52X.553 16.6 
Sierras Bayas 8X5,000 12.6 524,553 16.6 
Calera Avellaneda 3X0,000 7.1 303,607 9.6 
Villa Carlos Von 
Bernard * 3X0,000 7.1 303,607 9.6 
ZONE TWO 1 , 1 » .000 100.0 .19.8 7Ì0.770 100.0 15.4 











Cia. Argentina de 
Cemento Portland 1X6,000 10.0 131,090 17.9 
Parana 1X6,000 10. a 131,090 17.9 
Cia. Sud Americana 202,000 13.9 191,120 26.2 
Duraesnil 202,000 13.9 191,120 26.2 
ZONE THREE 523,000 100.0 7.1 425,193 100.0 9.0 
Loma Hegra 15S,000 29.6 131,741 31.0 
San Juan 155,000 29.6 
Corcemar 175.00Q 33.5 178,649 X2.0 
Capdeville 175,000 33.5 178,64? 42.0 
Cia. Sud Americana 193,000 36.9 11»,803 27.0 
Fanqueua 193,000 36.9 114,803 27.0 
ZONE FOUR XOX.OOO 100.0 5.5 320,073 100,0 6.7 
Loma Negra 170,000 X2.1 151,X71 47.3 
Frias 170,000 42.1 151,471 47.3 
Cia Sud Americana 2 3 X . 0 0 0 S7.9 168,602 52.7 
Campo Salta 23X.OOO 57.9 168,602 52.7 
ZONE FIVE 168,000 100.0 2.3 Ì13.X79 100.0 2.4 
State Factory 1 6 8 , 0 0 0 100.0 113,479 100.0 
Comodoro Kivadavia 1 6 8 , 0 0 0 100.0 113,479 , 100.0 
INDUSTRY TOTAL 7 , 3 5 3 , 0 0 0 100 0 4,7X2,712 100.0 
Source: Anuario de la Asociación de Fabricantes de Cemento Portland,.Buenos Aires, 1970 
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Table 3 - Market shares of firms according to regional markets, 1975 
(tonnes and percentages) 
Tonnes 
Capacity 
% Zone % Country Tonnes 
Deliveries 
























Pipinas 168,000 52.0 133,069 
Cia. Argentina de 
Cemento Portland 585,000 18.2 453,607 
Sierras Bayas 585,000 18.2 453,607 













ZONE TWO 773,000 100.0 25.6 676,336 100.0 20.7 
Core enar 425,000 SS.O 352,289 52.1 
Yocsina .260,000 33.6 210,16S 31.1 
Kiloraetro 7 165,000 21.3 142,1Î4 21.0 
Cia. Argentina de 
Camento Portland 146,000 18.9 133j380 19.7 
Parana 146,000 18.9 133,380 19.7 
Cia. Sud Americana 202,000 26.1 190,667 28.2 
Dumesnil 202,000 26.1 190,667 28.2 
ZONE THREE 493,000 100.0 10.0 302,502 100.0 9.2 
Loma Negra 125,000 23.4 73,854 24.4 
San Juan 125,000 23.4 73,854 24.4 
Corcemar 125,000 35.5 112,992 37.4 
Capdeville 125,000 35.5 112,992 37.4 
Cia. Sud Americana 193,000 39.1 115,656 38.2 
Panqueua 193,000 39.1 115,656 38.2 
ZONE FOUR 344,000 100.0 7.0 216,599 100.0 
Loma Negra 144,000 41.9 100,931 46.6 
Frias 144,000 41.9 100,931 46.6 
Cia. Sud Americana 200,000 58.1 115,668 53.4 
Campo Salta 200,000 58.1 115,668 53.4 
ZONE FIVE 120,000 100.0 2.4 73,299 100.0 2.2 
State Factory 120,000 100.0 73,299 100.0 
Comodoro Rivadavia 120,000 100.0 73,299 100.0 
INDUSTRY TOTAL 4,937,000 100.0 3,271,209 100.0 
Source: Anuario de la Asociación de Fabricantes de Cemento Portland, Buenos Aires, 1965. 
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Table 6 - Relative changes in market shares of major cement groups 1965-1975 
according to installed capacity 
(tonnes per year and percentages) 





Loma Negra 2 ,443,000 49. 5 3,725,000 50.7 4 ,270,000 49.4 
Corcemar 768,000 15. 6 1,500,000 20.4 1 ,595,000 18.4 
Cia. Argentina de 
Cemento Portland 734,000 14. 8 991,000 13.5 991,000 11.5 
Calera Avellaneda 280,000 5. 7 340,000 4.6 750,000 8.7 
Cia. Sud Americana 
de Cemento Portland 595,000 12. 1 629,000 8.6 776,000 9.0 
State Factories 120,000 2. 4 168,000 2.3 268,000 3.1 
T O T A L 4 ,937,000 100. 0 7,353,000 100.0 8 ,650,000 íoao 
Source: La Industria Argentina del Cemento Portland, Anuario de la Asocia-
ción de Fabricantes de Cemento Portland, Buenos Aires, 1966, 1970, 1975. 
Table 7 - Relative changes in market shares of major cement groups 1965-1975 
according to sales (deliveries) 
(tonnes per year and percentages) 





Lorna Negra 1 ,393,372 42.6 2,455,196 51.8 2,461,248 44.9 
Corcemar 598,350 18.3 740,252 • 15.6 972,833 19.7 
Cia. Argentina de 
Cemento Portland 586,987 • 17.9 655,643 13.8 780,034 14.3 
Calera Avellaneda 197,210 6.0 303,602 6.6 620,382 11.3 
Cia. Sud Americana 
de Cemento Portland 421,991 12.9 474.525 10.0 503.948 9.2 
State Factories 73,299 2.2 113,479 2.4 142,377 2.6 
T O T A L 3 ,271,209 100.0 4,742,712 íoao 5,481,121 íoao 
Source: Anuario de la Asociación de Fabricantes de Cemento Portland, Buenos 
Aires, 1965, 1970, 1975. 
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Tabla 8 - Basic statistica on the Argentine cement industry, 1913-1945 
































1913 1 14,400 2,900 456,100 99.4 20.14 59.6 
1914 1 14,400 3,500 411,200 99.2 24.31 • 52.0 
1915 1 14,400 4,250 253,100 94.6 29.51 29.6 
1916 1 14,400 4,250 159,500 96.8 29.51 19.4 
1917 2 20,160 5,100 102,500 95.0 25.30 12.2 
1918 2 20,160 5,100 85,550 95.0 25.30 10.0 
1919 3 166,160 36,789 128,089 71.3 22.14 14.8 
1920 3 166,160 79,160 203,860 61.1 47.70 23.0 
1921 3 166,160 75,816 229,029 66.9 45.63 25.2 
1922 3 166,160 78,384 263,884 70.3 47.17 28.2 
1923 3' 166,160 98,621 319,121 69.1 59.35 32.9 
1924 3. 166,160 142,543 412,743 65.5 85.79 41.1 
1925 3 166,160 132,736 443,936 70.1 79.88 42.9 
1926 3 239,160 169,227 527,327 67.9 70.76 49.5 
1927 3 239,160 200,876 601,176 66.6 83,99 54.8 
1928 3 297,760 228,063 668,963 65.9 76.59 59.3 
1929 3 370,760 343,366 787,466 56.4 92.61 67.9 
1930 3 511,000 412,171 155,695 45.4 BO.66 63.5 
1931 3 584,000 537,795 744,695 27.8 92.09 61.2 
1932 4 730,500 502,317 588,217 14.0 68.76 47.7 
1933 4 766,50 486,961 529,961 8.1 63.53 42.0 
1934 4 766,500 566,283 605,883 6.6 73.88 47.2 
1935 6 925,275 721,564 7S2.364 4.1 77.98 57.7 
1936 6 1,043,900 896,314 892,814 2.6 83.28 67.3 
1937 8 1,113,000 1,010,330 1 ,109,408 8.9 90.78 82.2 
1938 10 1,361,200 1,179,394 1 ,254,325 6.0 86.64 91.4 
1939 11 1,812,040 1,135,312 1 ,155,287 1.7 62.65 82.8 
1940 11 1,904,250 1,048 ,705 ' 1 ,049,744 0.1 55.07 74.1 
1941 11 1,904,250 1,169,092 1 ,128,240 - 60.92 78.3 
1942 11 1,904,?50 1,145,418 1 ,050,335 - 60.15 71.8 
1943 11 1,904,250 959,478 959,478 - 50.39 64.5 
1944 11 1,904,250 1,079,974 1 ,079,974 - 56.71 71.3 
1945 11 1,904,250 1,087,518 1 084,077 - 56.93 70.4 
1946 11 1,904,250 1,140,529 1 ,120,268. • - . 58.89 71.6 
1947 11 2,020,950 1,353,161 1 ,311,401 - %! 55.96 86.1 
1948 11 2,020,950 1,251,770 1 ,686,113 19.7 61.94 104.0 
1949 11 2,020,950 1,445,962 1,638,141 12.0 71.55 99.4 
1950' 11 2,020,950 1,557,911 2 009,176 22.8 77.09 119.8 
1951 11 2,020,950 1,542,526 1 983,942 21.6 76.33 116.2 
1952 12 2,140,950 1,539,481 1 936,406 22.4 71.91 111.5 
1953 12 2.260,950 1,659,321 1 ,723,616 2.9 73.39 97.6 
1954 12 2,260,950 1,708,689 1 ,946,767 12.5 75.57 108.5 
1955 12 2,518,950 1,868,926 1 090,044 10.5 74.03 113.2 
1956 13 2,897,100 1,028,725 1 ,063,085 1.5 70.03 110.9 
1957 13 2,897,100 2,340,424 2 ,356,013 1.0 80,79 124.4 
1958 13 3,083,000 2,442,515 2 ,431,366 - 79.23 126.2 
1959 13 3,167,000 2,343,367 2 332,765 0.4 74.01 119.0 
1960 13 3,186,000 2,613,775 1 ,614,703 0.1 82.04 131.1 
1961 13 3,957,000 2,876,414 1 ,873,136 0.1 72.51 141.9 
1962 13 3,977,000 1,920,471 2 901,934 0.1 73.43 141.9 
1963 14 4,'523,000 2,494,580 2 510,063 - 55.15 120.2 
1964 15 4,892,000 2,878,075 2 ,859,535 0.1 58.83 134.8 
1965 15 4 , 9 3 7 , 0 0 0 3 , 2 7 2 , 3 5 4 3 2 6 9 , 5 2 4 - 66.28 151.8 
1966 15 4 , 9 8 9 , 0 0 0 3 , 4 5 0 , 8 7 7 3 4 6 3 , 9 7 0 - 69.17 158.3 
1967 15 4 , 9 8 9 , 0 0 0 3 , 5 2 0 , 2 7 8 3 6 9 6 , 3 6 9 - 70.56 157.3 
1968 15 4 , 9 8 9 , 0 0 0 4 , 1 7 5 , 9 9 0 4 1 6 2 , 6 6 3 - 83.69 184.5 
1969 15 5 , 1 3 1 , 0 0 0 4 , 3 0 6 , ? 2 4 4 6 3 0 , 3 4 8 7.2' 93.93 2 0 2 . 0 
1970 16 7 , 3 5 3 , 0 0 0 4 , 7 4 3 , 3 7 5 5 0 3 7 , 1 3 8 5.9 64.51 216.4 
1971 16 8 , 0 9 5 , 0 0 0 5 , 5 3 3 , 1 0 1 5 5 3 7 , 5 9 1 0.4 68.35 2 3 4 , 4 
1972 1 6 8 , 1 0 5 , 0 0 0 5 , 4 4 4 , 9 5 8 5 3 9 4 , 1 7 8 0.1 67.18 225.0 
1973 16 8 , 1 5 0 , 0 0 0 5 , 1 8 1 , 4 3 0 5 1 8 9 , 1 7 4 - 63.93 213.1 
1974 1 6 8 , 5 5 0 , 0 0 0 5 , 3 9 2 , 2 4 0 5 4 0 4 , 7 0 2 - 63.10 218.8 
1975 17 8 , 6 5 0 , 0 0 0 5 , 4 6 3 , 5 9 0 5 4 8 1 , 1 2 1 - 67.20 218.6 
Source: Calculated•from data in Anuario 1975 of the Asociación de Fabricantes de Cemento 
Portland. 
a/ There were some 1 0 0 , 2 3 5 tons of cement imported ir. 1947, but it was not released on the 




LEVEL OF TECHNOLOGY EMPLOYED IN THE ARGENTINE CEMENT INDUSTRY 
1« Introduction 
In this section we discuss the level of technology incorporated into the 
Argentine cement plants in terms of the process, equipment and control systems 
employed in the cement plants in the country, the scale at which they are operated 
and their technical efficiency in terms of identifiable technical parameters at 
different plants. 
The information contained in this and subsequent sections of the paper is 
based on interviews and plant visits carried out at each of the five major 
Argentine cement firms - Loma Negra S.A., CORCEMAR S.A., Cia. Argentina de Cemen-
to Portland S.A., Cia Sud Americana de Cemento Portland S.A. and Calera Avellane-
da S.A. In addition the Asociación de Fabricantes de Cemento Portland in Buenos 
Aires, the Ministerio de Industrias and the Ministerio de Comercio furnished me 
with complementary information about the industry and particular aspects concerning 
new investment projects. 
Before detailing the technology used by each of the major cement firms in 
Argentina it is worthwhile pointing out some basic similarities and differences 
between the findings of this research and of the parallel research carried out in 
Mexico. 22/ As in Mexico it was found that the largest firms, which were also the 
fastest growing firms had incorporated the most up-to-date technology and, in 
terms of technical parameters were the most efficient. The largest firms were also 
those that most effectively developed their internal technical capacity, thus 
negotiating better terms and more effective technology transfer with the machinery 
suppliers. 
However, as we observed in Section 1 of this paper, in Argentina the cement 
firm that is the langestand fastest growing, and uses the most up-to-date technology 
and is the most efficient in terms of technical parameters is not connected with 
foreign capital. On the contrary, in this particular sector we found that the 
firm which was a subsidiary of a foreign cement company, although it has one fairly 
large scale plant, does not use modern technology, is not technically the most 
efficient and has no policy towards developing a local technological capacity 
22/ It should be borne in mind that the major part of the research on which 
this paper on Argentina was based was conducted in 197M-. Since that time there 
have been important changes in the behaviour of the Argentine economy and in the 
regulatory mechanisms governing that economy which may well render some of the 
observations and predictions contained in this paper irrelevant to the current 
situation. However, the main conclusions of this paper are still relevant since 
they are based on an overall assessment of the industry's development with 
reference to technology acquisition and development: since I am not aware of any 
important new investment put on stream in the Argentine cement industry since 
1975 I would suggest that the overall changes in the pace and nature of the 
economic activity in Argentina do not alter the information or modify the 
conclusions regarding innovation and technical capacity contained in this paper. 
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within the firm. The reasons for this were suggested earlier; the peculiar role 
of foreign capital in the Argentine.cement industry is not typical of its role in 
the cement sectors in other Latin American countries. However, the nature of the 
Argentine industrial entrepreneur and the nature, location and timing of the 
growth of the cement industry in Argentina enabled local capital to gain control 
of the industry during its first phase of expansion in the 1930's and to 
consolidate that expansion in the 1950's and 60's. Access to European technology 
and education enabled the Argentine nationals and immigrants, thus allowing them 
to develop a technical base which was sufficiently competitive with the kinds of 
technical expertise offered by foreign capital in the sector. 
2. Loma Negra 
The largest firm which is also the firm with the largest number of individual 
plants and the firm which has the fastest rate of growth since the war is the 
Buenos Aires based firm of Loma Negra S.A. 
As we saw above this firm operates five cement plants in various parts of the 
country. However the bulk of its activities are based in the Province of Buenos 
Aires where its two largest plants are located. These are the plants at Olavarria 
which was the first of the Loma Negra plants to be established in 1928, and the 
comparatively new plant at Barker which went into production in 1956. Plant visits 
were made to both these plants which represented different aspects of the way in 
which the firm is incorporating modern technology in its productive installations, 
and developing its own internal technical capacity. 
Olavarria plant 
Technology employed. 
The Olavarria plant, which has a total capacity of 2 million tpy is the 
largest plant in Argentina as well as being the biggest plant controlled by the Lo-
ma Negra group. Since this was the first plant established by the firm its 
capacity comprises a mixture of old equipment, right back to the original kiln set 
up in 1928, to the most modern line of production yet seen in Argentina, which 
went on stream in 1970. 
In effect the Olavarria plant can be divided into two separate plants or at 
least two separate production units since ancilliary and administrative services 
are common to both parts. The first unit consists of the six oldest kilns which 
were erected between 1928 and 1963. The total productive capacity of these six 
kilns is 1 million tpy; all these kilns are wet process or semi-wet process kilns. 
The most recent ones incorporate process innovations such as Lepol filters and 
grills and even the oldest kilns have been modified by the addition of chains and 
filters to reduce fuel consumption in the kiln. 
Another important innovation employed in the wet process unit of the Olava-
rria plant is the FOLAX planetary cooler attached to the kiln N2 6. This, was an 
innovatory investment since all previous kilns at the plant are operated in 
conjunction with Fuller grate coolers and in 1961/1962 when the kiln 6 expansion 
was designed, the planetary cooler had only just been redeveloped from its non-
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operative pre-war prototype. 
The major part of the basic equipment used in the wet process plant at 
Olavarria is standard process technology and differs little from the equipment 
at other cement plants in Argentina or elsewhere which are over ten years old. 
However it is important to note that at the time when the investment was made 
several aspects of the equipment now regarded as standard conventional machinery 
were only recently developed, and their incorporation into the Loma Negra plant 
represented a very advanced technology outlook on the part of the firm as well as 
demonstrating that the technical personnel of the company were strictly abreast 
of innovation in the sector on a global basis. 
In this respect the FOLAX planetary cooler incorporated into the kiln Nfi 6 
production line has already been mentioned. However before this date Loma Negra 
considered that it had established itself as the technical vanguard of the 
Argentine cement industry, working in close collaboration with those European 
firms responsible for major process innovations in cement technology. 
It is worth recalling that Loma Negra, alone of the surviving Argentine 
companies which established themselves as cement producers before World War 2 
initiated production with Rotary kilns; all the other firms, perhaps because of 
previous connections with lime manufacture, ujtempted to initiate cement 
production in vertical kilns, changing to rotary kilns only after unsuccessful 
attempts to produce cement of satisfactory quality in rotary kilns had 
necessitated the change of technique. 
Another example of the way in which this firm has kept abreast of recent 
innovations, even before they have been adopted on a wide commercial scale was 
the purchase of the Lepol Kiln (Ns 6) in 1952. The company claim that although 
there had been many Lepol kilns installed at cement plants throughout the world 
since the development of the semi-dry process, the kiln erected at the Loma 
plant was the first in the world which applied the Lepol pelletization/grill 
system to wet materials. It is reported that the man responsible for the 
invention and development of the Lepol process, Dr. Lellep spent some time at the 
Loma Negra plant prior to the investment where he collaborated with the firm's 
technical staff in the design of the adapted Lepol kiln to meet the production 
conditions prevailing at the plant. 
The way in which the firm acquired its technology and its general attitudes 
to innovation will be discussed at greater length later in this paper. The 
purpose of this section is to examine the most up-to-date technology at the 
various plants and to assess how this technology relates to the technology 
frontier at the time the investment was made. Clearly an assessment of the most 
up-to-date technology at the Olavarria plant must focus on the newes production 
line incorporating the 1 million ton a year kiln NQ 7 which is backed up by a 
completely computerised system of process and quality control. 
The rated capacity of this kiln, which was erected in 1970/1971 is, 
according to the firm, 1 million tpy which at the time it went on stream 
doubled the capacity of the plant from 1 to 2 million tpy. 
The engineering capacity of the kiln, according to Polysius who built and 
installed it, is 2400 tpd which, on an average of 330 days per year gives a 
total annual capacity of just under 800,000 tpy. However production, 
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significantly higher than this figure, up to 3000 + tpd, has been recorded and 
it therefore seems legitimate to use the firm's own assessment of capacity for 
this kiln. 
This production line which went on stream in June 1970 is entirely 
separate from the rest of the plant, having its own primary and secondary 
crushing system, raw meal grinders, perhomogenisation silos as well as the kiln-
cooler complex and the cement grinding and distribution system. The list of 
equipment is given in table 9. 
The equipment employed for all stages of the process, although of large 
capacity and incorporating the most modern design features, are the conventional 
equipment for modern cement plants. The innovation of the planetary cooler which 
was incorporated into kiln Nc 6 was not repeated in the design of kiln N2 7 
because it was thought that the experience of the firm in dealing with 
operational problems which occurred in the grate coolers used in conjunction 
with the other kilns was sufficient to compensate the minor efficiency advantages 
implied by the planetary coolers. 
What distinguishes this line of production from the rest of the plant, 
apart from its obvious and substantial superiority in terms of scale of 
production is that the complete process is fully automated. The rest of the plant 
is controlled by centralised systems of close circuit control. 
Table 9 - List of equipment suppliers at Loma Negra's Olavarria plant 
Dry process plant Wet process plant 








5. Fuller Grate 
1. Folax FCS 
F.L.S. 
3 x 170 tph 
automatic 
Source: Data compiled by the author. 
Crushing equipment 














1 x 40 tph 
manual 
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Automation and quality control. 
The automation of the kiln NQ 7 production line at the Olavarria plant of 
Loma Negra represented, at the time of its installation, the most complete and 
advanced system ever applied to a comercially-run cement plant in Latin America 23/. 
The automation system at the plant was a joint project developed by Polysius 
who were the main machinery suppliers for the expansion of capacity at the plant, 
and A.E.G. the German electronics company and the German cement firm of Dickerdoff 
Zementwork. The system operates the whole process control procedure as well as 
a Time-Sharing system for the firm's administrative tasks. 
The system developed for the operation of the cement factory was, according 
to the firm, adapted from an early control system developed at Houston, Texas as 
part of the missile control programme. The main feature of the system at 
Olavarria is the fact that it is a feedback system which allows variations, new 
information and ongoing analysis to be fed into the programme and corrected for, 
while the process is in operation. 
The system is fully comprehensive, capable of automatic control of the 
complete production process from the quarrying of raw materials to the bagging 
and distribution installations for the finisuc-d product. The following stages of 
production are incorporated into the programme: 
a) Selection of raw materials of different qualities at the quarry. 
b) Feeding primary crushers. 
c) Transportation of raw materials to raw meal grinders. 
d) Transportation to, and operation of, homogenisation silos. 
e) Feeding of kiln, fuel and raw materials. 
f) Operation of cooler. 
g) Transportation of clinker to and from silos, and to cement grinding mills. 
h) Feeding and operation of cement grinding mills. 
i) Transport of ground cement to and operation of automatic bagging plants 
and distribution system. 24/ 
23/ Competitors and cynics have suggested that although the plant is 
equipped with a very sophisticated automation system, the system is no fully 
operative. While I accept that periodic problems might cause the replacement of 
the automatic control system by more conventional control procedures the calibre 
of the technical personnel running the system, the time invested in the development 
of the technical support necessary to operate it and the subsequent adaptation 
carried out by the firm in addition to the programmes handed over by the suppliers 
all indicate that the system is planned not only to be fully operative but is 
backed up by the necessary technical capacity to ensure that it can be operated 
by the firm's own personnel. 
24/ This list of functions is designed to illustrate the comprehensiveness 
and complexity of the automation system. For more exact and detailed information 
see J. Teutenberg, "Automación del proceso de una fábrica de cemento en Argentina", 
translation and reprint from Zement, Kalk, Gips, Año 24, Na 4, pp. 141-151. 
- 33 -
In addition to the process control outlined above, the system incorporates 
an automatic system of sampling and analysis which is connected to an X-Ray 
spectrometer. Samples are automatically prepared and transported to the X-Ray 
analysis apparatus. This is connected to an analogue computer which analyses the 
constituents of each sample and calculates the deviation in each sample from the 
permitted variation of each constituent element. The analogue computer then 
calculates the required correction and feeds this information into the main 
programme where it is incorporated into the production control process and 
corrections are effected. 
Samples are taken from the grinding equipment, homogenisation silos, the 
kiln feed and the cement grinding equipment. A sample takes only three minutes 
to prepare, collect and analyse and the analysis are carried out every 20 to 30 
minutes at the various points of the production process where control is exercised. 
The analysis covers the composition of the samples in terms of the following 
elements: silicate, aluminium, iron, calcium, magnesium, sulphur and potassium. 
In this way the system can control variations in the raw materials and 
storage silos and can determine the chemical composition of the different components 
ensuring an optimal raw meal mix for the productive process. The original and 
corrected composition of the raw materials are stored in the system's memory to 
be referred to when subsequent analysis requires corrections at different stages 
of the process. The system therefore offers a total process control system with 
automatic feedback which ensures the constant monitoring of the materials in process 
thus ensuring a constant and consistent quality in the finished product. 25/ 
Another feature of the system is the existence of static ondulators which are 
connected to accumulation batteries which ensure the continued supply of power to 
the system regardless of alterations in or failures of the grid supply. This is 
important because an interruption in the power supply would destroy the data 
stored in the memory, thus rendering ineffective subsequent analytic procedures. 
A sub-programme controls the operation of the kiln-cooler complex, monitoring 
and recording kiln feed, air and gas feed, exhaust gases, etc. This gives the data 
basis for subsequent modifications of the process. 
The whole system is controlled from a three storeyed control building which 
houses the mechanical installations as well as the computer and associated 
calculators and central control desks, X-Ray analysis and closed circuit T.V. 
monitors. 
The computer is not fully occupied by these process control and analysis 
tasks and a further time-sharing system is used for administrative tasks such as 
wages and salary calculations and for invoice control both for sales from this 
plant and other plants belonging to the Loma Negra group. 
The system,as described by the suppliers and the firm itself, is totally 
25/ While effective quality control is a main objective of the installation 
of the automation process at the plant, technical efficiency in terms of reduction 
of the labour output ratio and a reduction in the fuel utilisation of the system is 
also potentially important. This is discussed later on in this section. 
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comprehensive and adapted to the requirements of production and quality control 
at the plant. Very few cement plants in the world have been installed with this 
degree of automatic control with feedback which has to be backed up by 
considerable technical expertise in the form of electronics, electrical chemical 
and mechanical engineering skills as well as specialised computer programming and 
analytical personnel. In contrast to the Swiss controlled firm in Mexico which 
is currently (1976) installing a comprehensive automation system with feedback, 
Loma Negra claims that it is able to operate the system with no external technical 
assistance from the machinery suppliers or the designers of the original system 
and software to operate it. 26/ In many instances Loma Negra's own technical 
personnel have improved the range and flexibility of the systfem as delivered by 
the suppliers by more than doubling the number of programmes and increasing the 
range of technical problems for which the computer is used to solve. The computer 
is thus able to be used for operational research and design purposes as well as 
production and quality control. 27/ 
As the discussion of technology at the other plants illustrates, no other 
firm in Argentina has installed automatic control of cement production nor are 
any of the other plants belonging to the Loma Negra group operated by computer 
contrpl with feedback. The more recently-installed capacity at the Olavarria plants 
belonging to Calera Avellaneda and Cia. Argentina de Cemento Portland are 
operated by conventional closed-circuit control systems and no other plant claims 
the degree of precision of process control or the degree of consistency in quality 
control made possible by the automatic installations at the Loma Negra plant. 
Before we go on to look at the operation of this newest production line at 
Olavarria in terms of technical efficiency we should bear in mind that although 
the automatic installations are designed to be used solely for the new dry process 
2,500-3,000 tpd kiln the system can be potentially adapted to the other production 
lines at the plant; in addition functions other than ongoing process control -
quality control, homogenisation, research, design and administration functions -
can be carried out by the computer together with its qualified personnel on behalf 
of the whole plant at the Olavarria site, and, in the case of certain functions, 
on behalf of other cement plants in the group as well as the commercialisation 
and administrative functions of the Buenos Aires headquarters. 
Technical efficiency. 
The different technologies utilised at the Olavarria plant are illustrated by 
the different technical parameters indicating technical efficiency associated 
with the new kiln, compared with the older parts of the plant. Fuel utilisation 
26/ This statement should not be misinterpreted or misunderstood. The 
ability to run the system after installation with no on-going technical assistance 
does not mean that there was no technical assistance involved in the design and 
setting up of the system in the first place. This is discussed in the next 
section of the paper as part of the analysis of acquisition of technology. 
27/ This aspect of the firm's operations will also be discussed in the next 
section when we deal with the technical capacity of the firm and its ability to 
effect innovations. 
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at the plant is shown in the table below: 
Table 10 - Fuel utilisation at the Olavarria - Lorna Negra plant 
(tons per day and kilocalories per kilogramme) 
















Wet 1928 c. 1800 
Wet 1936 c. 1800 
Wet n.a. c. 1800 
Wet 1952 c. 1800. 
Wet (Lepol) 1952 15/1600 
Wet 1963 1400 
Dry 1970 800 
Laverage 
Source: Data compiled by the author. 
As is shown above the new dry process kiln (NQ 7) has a fuel consumption 
which is under half the average fuel consumption of the other six kilns. The 
1,000 tpd kiln erected in 1963, which in fact incorporated fairly advanced 
technology for the date of its installation including a planetary cooler and on-
line closed circuit control, has a KCal/kg ratio of 1,400: this figure which is 
based on 1974 production returns is somewhat below the international best 
practice ratio of 1,150 KCal/kg quoted for the same year for the same kind of 
technology. 28/ The figure of 800 KCal/kg recorded for kiln Nc 7 compares 
favourably with the best practice figure given for the same year, which in fact 
was 850 KCal/kg. 29/ 
Unfortunately data on labour time per unit of production at the Olavarria 
plant was not made available at the level of individual kilns. The figure of one 
hour twenty minutes (1.33 hrs) was quoted with reference to the whole plant; 
however the production engineer at the plant indicated that it was possible to 
28/ See R. Pearson, IDB/ECLA 1977 (1) op. cit., p. 7, fig. 3. 
29/ A direct comparison is somewhat misleading since the best practice 
figures quoted in the source given above was on the basis of a raw material with 
a moisture content of 10%. The moisture content of the Olavarria raw materials 
is not given. Also it is not known what size the kiln capacity of the best 
practice ratio is calculated on; economies of scale as well as efficiency of 
fuel-saving technology affect fuel consumption in cement plants. Nor is the 
effect of the quality control and process control systems described above known 
- it may be that the best practice ratios are worked out on the basis of plants 
with much less exact control of inputs into the production process so that some 
of the fuel saving recorded at the Olavarria plant could be due to automation and 
control techniques as well as to the technology and scale factors mentioned above. 
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isolate those departments of the production line which were labour saving when 
the dry process was employed with respect to the wet process employed at the 
other kilns in the plant. According to his calculations the slurry preparation 
for the wet process kilns was more labour intensive than the dry meal preparation 
for the dry kiln in the ratio of 2:1 ; the kiln/cooler complete labour 
requirements for the wet process again were more labour intensive, this time in 
the ratio of 1.75:1; cement grinding and bagging and distribution plants were 
marginally labour saving in the dry process plant though this was not directly 
attributable to the difference in the two technologies since after calcination 
the processes are not dependent on the kind of crude preparation undertaken. On 
the other hand the primary and secondary crushing processes which are closely 
linked to the raw material preparation preceeding calcination used more labour 
for the dry process than for the wet process in the ratio of 2.35:1. 
These figures refer only to the labour actually used in production and not 
to any of the ancillary or technical labour used in general maintenance, cleaning, 
transportation, laboratory or other processes contingent on the production 
process. However, even within these strict terms of reference they are very 
unsatisfactory for the basis of analysis of the labour saving properties of the 
new dry process kiln at the plant for the same reasons as given above with respect 
to the analysis of the fuel saving properties of the kiln; namely that the 
technology, process control and scale factors are not isolated. 30/ 
The fuel and labour saving nature of the use of short dry kilns plus pre-
heaters in comparison with the more old-fashioned long wet process kilns is more 
readily demonstrated when we examine the technology used at the Barker plant of 
Loma Negra where wet kilns have been converted to dry kilns and the subsequent 
savings in fuel and labour have been recorded at the same plant. This is 
discussed immediately below. However, in spite of the impossibility of isolating 
the various factors contributing to higher technical efficiency at the Olavarria 
plant with the new dry process kiln it should be remembered that in addition to 
the scale and process technology factors which indicate higher efficiency for 
the kind of technology and capacity of the kiln in question the installation of 
the automatic control system with feedback not only reduces labour time 
necessary for the operation of the kiln but also gives the technical department 
30/ This is a deficiency in any analysis based on intensive case-study data. 
In order to assess the proportionate contributions to efficiency made by these 
factors, cross section analysis would have to be made of a number of plants using 
the comparable technology and process control systems. Even such an analysis 
would suffer distortions arising from the different operating conditions of 
different plants in different countries etc. ; moreover it is doubtful whether 
there are a sufficient number of cement plants installed' in the world with 
comparable technology, and with the relevant scales and control system to make such 
an analysis statistically reliable. Cross sectional analysis rarely takes 
technology into account. C. Diaz Alejandro, "Labour Productivity and Other 
Characteristics of Cement Plants: An- International Comparison", in Yale University 
Economic Growth Centre Discussion Paper N2 105, Feb. 1971, in a multiple 
regression analysis of 41 Latin American plants, and 26 plants from United States, 
Canada and Australia, excludes type of technology and differences in efficiency 
parameters of different technologies from its comparative analysis of labour 
productivity. 
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of the firm the process data necessary to make modifications in the operation of 
this and other plants belonging to the group, thus potentially increasing the 
efficiency of the firm still further. 
Barker plant 
The Barker plant of Loma Negra which is in the South of Buenos Aires Province, 
directly South of the capital, while not containing any equipment or system of 
control which can be considered in anayway more advanced than conventional modern 
equipment universally employed for cement production, is significant precisely for 
the fact that the original wet process plants, installed up to twenty years ago 
have been converted to the dry process. This is the only case in Argentina where 
previously installed equipment rendered obsolete or suboptimal by subsequent 
technical progress has been modified to incorporate later research 31/; generally, 
existing investment is usually considered technologically fixed apart from minor 
modifications to improve the efficiency of that particular process and major new 
innovations are incorporated only when new capacity investments are made. 
The plant at Barker first went into production in 1956 (see Section 1). The 
original plant comprised a single wet process plant with a capacity of 1,400 tpd 
(440,000 tpy). This was a standard wet process plant with no preheater or 
pelletisation process and conventional grate coolers and semi-automatic bagging 
plant. The plant was expanded in 1963 by the addition of a 2,500 tpd Allis 
Chalmers wet process kiln which increased total capacity at the plant to 1,174,000 
tpy. Both lines of production were supplied as turnkey projects with the main 
supplier using its own equipment for the different stages of production; thus 
each line of production comprised all F.L. Smidth or all Allis Chalmers machinery. 
In the late I960's it was decided by the firm to convert the wet process 
kilns at the plant to dry process kilns with the objective of increasing the 
capacity at the plant and increasing the technical efficiency by reducing fuel 
consumption of the kilns. A major factor influencing this decision was the 
improvement in homogenisation techniques which had taken place since the 1950's 
and research carried out by the firm in relation to the investment in the new 
automated dry process kiln at the Olavarria plant. 
Conversion of the Barker plant was carried out by F.L. Smidth. The result 
of the conversion was: 
1) Marginal increase of capacity at the plant - estimated at 200 tpd. 
2) Significant reduction of fuel utilisation in production and therefore of 
unit production costs at the plant. 
3) Acquisition of technical knowledge by the technical departments of Loma 
31/ Later in this section we discuss the newest kiln at the Cia. Argentina 
de Cemento Portland plant at Sierras Bayas; this plant was originally a wet 
process plant operating in the United States; when it was transferred to Argenti-
na it was shortened and fitted with a preheater; however this is a different 
situation to the one at Barker where the technology of the production equipment 
was modified in situ purely to increase productivity at the same plant. 
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Negra which has enabled them to plan and design the conversion of wet process 
kilns at the Olavarria plant without any outside technical assistance. 32/ 
Fuel utilisation. 
The conversion at tho Barker plant resulted in significant fuel saving 
improvements at the plant; the average fuel consumption at the Barker» plant: 
before and after conversion to the Dry Process was as follows: 
Table 11 - Fuel consumption at Barker plant 
before and after conversion to Dry Process 
(kilocalories per kilogramme) 
K i l n Na KCal/kg clinker Wet Process Dry Process 
19600 1,000 
Source : Data compiled by the author. 
The- saving in fuel utilisation effected by the conversion was thus in the 
oreder of nearly 40% which, with a constant increase in the relative price of 
all types of fuel in Argentina, represented significant savings in unit production 
costs. 
The benefits external to the Barker plant but internal to the whole firm of 
engaging in this technology updating investment are considerable. Earlier we 
referred to the acquisition of skills by the relevant technical departments which 
would enable the firm's engineers to carry out similar conversions at the Olava-
rria plant without engaging outside technical assistance. If this does prove to 
be the case it can be expected that the investment cost implied by this capital 
conversion would in fact be substantially lower when repeated at the Olavarria plant 
(in constant prices) than the estimated cost at the Barker plant which included the 
purchase of the technical know-how and design work as well as the actual capital 
goods involved in the modification of the productive installations. 33/ Assuming 
no reversal in the trend of relative prices of fuel (natural gas) and the relevant 
capital goods and technical and engineering services required to effect such a 
32/ At least this is the claim made by the firm which will be examined in 
more detail in the next section of the paper when we discuss technical assistance 
and internal technical capacity. Economic conditions have not as yet justified the 
conversion of the Olavarria kilns so that this claim has not so far been tested. 
33/ Estimates of the cost of the Barker conversion vary from $ 6.8 to 
2 14.7 million dolars depending on the date at which the esirimate was made. 
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conversion it can be predicted that the cost-saving effect for the Olavarria plant 
of a similar investment would be even more substantial than that recorded at 
Barker and that the capital cost of the project would be offset by the fuel 
saving and other unit cost reduction effects in an even shorter time period. 
Unfortunately no data is available to compare the labour utilisation in terms 
of man-hours per ton of cement produced before and after conversion of the Barker 
plant to dry process. The labour utilisation figure given after conversion was 
1 hour 20 minutes per ton of cement dispatched from the factory which was the 
same figure quoted for the average labout time at the Olavarria plant. It can be 
expected that utilisation of the dry process and rationalisation of the plant 
which accompanied its conversion has had a labour-saving effect in the same 
departments that recorded labour saving in the comparison at the Olavarria plant 
between the wet and the dry process kilns - i.e. raw material preparation, 
calcination and cooling, cement grinding and bagging and distribution plant though 
again it must be remembered that the difference in the scales of the respective 
dry-process kilns at the two plants will modify the difference in labour 
utilisation recorded between wet and dry kilns at the Olavarria plant. 
3. Other Loma Negra plants 
Frias plant 
No detailed data is available about the technology employed at the other 
plants belonging to the Loma Negra group. The Frias plant was acquired as the 
result of the take over of the C0IN0R plant in the 1950's. This is a wet process 
plant erected before the second world war which is still operating with virtually 
the same equipment as when it first went on stream, the only substantial 
modification being the changeover from fuel-oil or coal to natural gas. 
This plant is reported to have the lowest labour productivity of the whole 
Loma Negra group; the ratio of man hours per ton of cement produced at this plant 
is 3 1/2 hours per ton. 
San Juan plant 
The San Juan plant also originally belonged to another company but Loma Negra 
took over a controlling interest and the technical and commercial management of 
the plant before it went into production in 1963. This is a dry process plant 
designed, supplied and to a large extent financed by Krupps of West Germany, 
(before Krupps took over Polysius and largely merged its cement machinery 
manufacture with that of Polysius). 
Zapala plant 
The Zapala plant of Cementerà Patagonica was also originally organised by a 
separate commercial and financial group before Loma Negra was invited to join a 
consortium and take over sole technical and commercial management of the company. 
This company had a longer gestation period than that of San Juan; negotiations 
began in 1960 while production did not commence until 1970. Lorna Negra took over 
- 40 -
its responsibilities for the plant in 1969, together with a minority share 
interest which has been continually increasing since that date. The other 
members of the consortium are Cia. Naviera Perez Company S.A. (the original entre-
preneur for the plant) and the international finance company of ADELA. 
The Zapala plant which has an annual capacity of 200,000 tpy is a dry 
process plant with prehomogenisation unit and preheater and short kiln which is 
controlled by conventional closed-circuit control methods. The machinery and 
equipment were supplied under a turnkey contract with Humboldt. The design is 
such that capacity could be doubled by the addition of another kiln to be used in 
conjunction with the existing ancillary equipment and it is probable that expansion 
will take place if demand warrants it since the raw materials in the area are 
extremely plentiful and engineering projects in the South of the country are 
increasing local demand. 
While few details of fuel utilisation or labour productivity are available, 
the latter can be surmised from the fact that the Zapala plant employed, in 1974, 
108 workers, out of a total staff of 134, including technical and administrative 
staff for its 200,000 tpy capacity. In the same year the Frias plant employed 
247 workers out of a total staff of 300 for its smaller capacity of 180,000 tpy. 
The San Juan plant falls between the other two in terms of labour utilisation 
with 134 workers out of a total 170 labour force for its 190,000 tpy plant. 
The rest of this section examines technology employed at the plants 
belonging to the other cement producing groups in the country. The data available 
about these other plants in many cases is not as comprehensive as that made 
available by Loma Negra since, in varying degrees the other companies adopted a 
much less open approach to the research being carried out than did Loma Negra 
itself. In only one case - that of Cia. Sud Americana de Cemento Portland - was 
a plant visit actually refused and consequently information about that company is 
extremely sketchy. C0RCEMAR allowed brief visits to both its Cordoba plants; 34/ 
Calera Avellaneda allowed an extensive plant visit and several subsequent 
interviews at its headquarters in Buenos Aires. Cia. Argentina de Cemento 
Portland allowed a brief visit to the Sierras Bayas plant plus several other 
interviews, though its policy about revealing information for research was less 
open than most of the other companies mentioned above. 
4. CORCEMAR 
As we noted in Section 1 the firm of CORCEMAR was established on the site of 
the earliest known cement plant in Argentina. The firm, which is mainly 
concentrated in the central zone of the country, has expanded its cement activities 
particularly since the beginning of the 1960's, the most important part of that 
expansion being the establishment of the new plant at Yocsina, Province of Cordoba. 
34/ No request was made either to visit the Pipinas or Capdeville plants 
of CORCEMAR nor the Parana plant of Cia. Argentina de Cemento Portland and there 
is no reason to suppose access would not have been granted. No attempt was made 
either to visit the State owned cement factory at Comodoro Rivadavia. 
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The Yocsina plant is the most modern of any of the four CORCEMAR plants; 
the Kilómetro 7 plant in the city of Cordoba which operates with rotary kilns 
originally purchased in 1932 is being run down because of physical limitations on 
expansion due to its now urban position. 35/ The Capdeville plant in the 
Province of Mendoza which first went into production in 1936 is a small plant 
(capacity 210,000 tpy) which is divided between three small kilns, the most 
recent being a F.L. Smidth dry process kiln imported in 1955. The other CORCEMAR 
plant, at Pipinas, in the Province of Buenos Aires has not been significantly 




The Yocsina plant , with a total installed capacity of 1,000,000 tpy is 
almost twice as big as the combined capacity of all the other three plants 
belonging to the group. The original plant, which went on stream in 1964 
comprised a short Humbolt dry process kiln with a single stage preheater. Since 
then the technology at the plant has been substantially modernised and more 
recently, expanded. In 1968 a prehomogenisation plant was acquired for use in 
conjunction with the existing kiln and in anticipation of future expansion which 
at that date was in the planning stage. 
The expansion at the plant which was completed in 1970 comprised a 
completely new production line, which operates in conjunction with the 
prehomogenisation unit installed a couple of years previously. The new kiln is a 
2,000 tpd Traylor-Fuller long dry kiln with no preheater. Ancillary equipment 
was also supplied by the Fuller group or their United States subcontractors. 36/ 
The new Yocsina plant is equipped with a system of X-ray analysis for samples 
taken from various parts in the production process for quality control purposes. 
However in contrast to the Olavarria plant the X-ray analysis equipment is not 
on-line (i.e. not automatically collected and fed into the analysing equipment) 
but has to be controlled manually. Without a programmed feedback control system 
the results of the analysis and relevant corrective action must be calculated 
separately and corrections made at the point of control for each stage of the 
process. 
35/ When this plant went into operation it was in fact outside the city, 
conveniently located close to a major railway terminal. Now, due to the expansion 
of the city it occupies a central urban position limiting its access to land for 
expansion, and putting pressure on the way the factory is operated because of 
the problem of industrial pollution. 
36/ Fullers is the United States licensee for equipment designed by the 
Humboldt group. Selection of a United States supplier was influenced in this case 
by the fact that part of the financing of the project was undertaken by the Export 
Import Bank of New York which specifically limits the purchase of capital equipment 
to that manufactured in the United States. The project was a turnkey project. The 
financing and other appects of the acquisition process for this project will be 
discussed in more detail in the following section of this paper. 
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The new Yocsina plant has conventional closed circuit control for each part 
of the production process but the control desks relating to the different stages 
are all housed in a central control room where operators are able to monitor the 
progress of the various stages and to switch control from automatic to manual 
should the system indicate parameters which are outside the range of variations 
allowed for in the closed circuit control system. 
Efficiency of technology. 
The equipment at the Yocsina plant, while fairly large scale in comparison 
with the rest of the Argentine industry, is not the technical vanguard of the 
industry but rather represents the employment of well-tested and tried standard 
equipment. Efficiency parameters, in so far as they are available, indicate that, 
when running at full capacity the Yocsina plant achieves adequate fuel utilisation 
ratios for the kind of equipment employed. The figure given for the fuel 
utilisation at the plant was 1,000 KCal/kg (see table 12) which is only 
marginally higher than the 950 KCal/kg quoted elsewhere as the best practice 
technique for this kind of equipment. The superiority of this plant over the 
other CQRCEMAR plants is illustrated by a comparison of the ratios shown in Table 
12. The Yocsina plant, with the largest scale and most up-to-date technology has 
the best fuel utilisation ratio of the whole group though this is still below that 
achieved in the most modern Loma Negra plants, as will be discussed below. 
The labour utilisation figures also indicate a substantial variation between 
the different technologies employed at the CORCEMAR plant. While the extremely 
high figure of 5 hours per ton of cement produced at the Kilometro 7 factory is 
discussed in more detail in relation to that factory it is interesting to examine 
the figure of 1 1/2 to 2 manhours given for the Yocsina plant. 37/ Although 
this is in fact lower than that achieved by the Loma Negra plants, an indication of 
the improvement in this ratio effected by the expansion at the plant can be deduced 
from the fact that the original 260,000 tpy plant operated with a total of 200 
workers. 38/ The expansion which added a further 700,000 tpy to the plant's 
capacity, involved the absorption of only a further 187 workers - that is an 
increase of 350% was effected with only a corresponding increase of 89% of the 
labour force. The original ratio of workers per ton of installed capacity at the 
plant was 1:1,300; in 1974 the ratio had improved to 1:2,600 which represents an 
increase of 100% in terms of potential productivity per worker employed. 
Kilometro 7 plant 
Technology employed. 
The old CORCEMAR plant in the city of Cordoba - Kilometro 7 - provides a 
total contrast to the new plant at Yocsina described above. The original Traylor-
Fuller kiln, erected in 1931 with a capacity, of 100 tpd is still operating. The 
37/ Unfortunately a more exact figure for labour utilisation at the plant 
was not made available. 
38/ This figure refers only to operative - not to technical and administrative 
personnel employed at the plant. 
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two other kilns at this plant are the Humboldt kiln erected in 1936 (140 tpd) and 
a F.L. Smidth kiln with a capacity of 260 tpd. Total rated capacity at the plant 
is 165,000 tpy. 
All the kilns at this plant are long dry process kilns which, when the first 
kilns were erected in the 1930's was the most advanced and suitable technology for 
the raw materials available in the Cordoba area. The urban location of this plant 
necessitated investment in anti-pollution equipment as early as 1958 when a 
Webster electrostatic precipitator was installed at the plant. 
In spite of the age and technical obsolescence of this plant, demand for the 
cement produced there has been maintained probably due to the kind of cement if 
produces which is of a much lighter colour than the ordinary grey cement produced 
by the normal production processes. 39/ 
Technical efficiency. 
The differences in technical efficiency between the new Yocsina plant and 
the old Kilometro 7 plant are illustrated by the respective fuel and labour 
utilisation figures illustrated in Table 12. The difference in fuel utilisation 
at the two plants is substantial, especially since the two plants ostensibly use 
the same technology - long, dry process plants with no preheaters. However the 
difference is clearly related in this case to the enormous differences in scale 
between the two plants, especially when it is remembered that the 165,000 tpy 
Kilometro 7 plant is composed of three separate small kilns while the million ton 
a year plant at Yocsina is made up of only two kilns, one of which has a capacity 
of 740,000 tpy. 
In addition the antiquity of the Kilometro 7 plant obviously has some 
bearing on the efficacity of the technology employed. There is no automatic 
control system at the plant, and all quality control procedures are carried out 
manually in a small laboratory. 
Labour utilisation at the Kilometro 7 plant is also very much higher than 
that at the Yocsina plant; explanations for this difference are similar to those 
for the differences in fuel utilisation - differences in scale, age and control of 
the production line. In addition it should be borne in mind that many of the 
materials-handling functions which are mechanised at the Yocsina plant by the use 
of conveyor belts and specially designed homogenisation silos are carried out 
manually at the Kilometro 7 plant. Thus the total employment at the Yocsina plant 
of 500 for its million ton a year capacity (1 man for every 2,000 typ capacity) 
is substantially less than the 260 employed at Kilometro 7 for the 165,000 tpy 
capacity (1 man for every 635 tons of yearly capacity). 
39/ The colour is due to the particular composition of the raw materials 
used at the plant. Manufacture of white cement, which does take place in Argenti-
na at some Portland oement plants and also at separate plants devoted to the 
production of white cement is more expensive than ordinary grey cement because of 
the different additives necessary to achieve the colour. Hence the popularity of 
the light coloured ordinary Portland cement produced at the Kilometro 7 plant. 
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Table 12 - Fuel utilisation and labour productivity 
at 4 CORCEMAR plants, 1976 



















Source: Interview with production engineer, CORCEMAR Head Office, Cordoba, 
a/ not available. 
Comparison of technical efficiency at the Loma Negra (Olavarria) and 
the CORCEMAR (Yocsina) plant 
It is interesting to compare the technical efficiency parameters of these 
two plants since the relevant figures both refer to the installation of completely 
new production lines installed at roughly the same date (both plants went on 
stream in 1970), and of comparable size - the new Yocsina kiln is slightly smaller, 
at 2,000 tpd compared with the Loma Negra new 2,400 tpd kiln. 
The fuel utilisation recorded for the Olavarria dry process kiln installed 
in 1970 was 800 KCal/kg clinker which is a 25% improvement on the 1,000 KCal/kg 
given for the Yocsina plant. One obvious factor which contributes to this 
difference is the different technologies employed at these two new production 
lines; while the Olavarria plant uses the short dry kiln in conjunction with a 
multi-stage pre-heater as well as a fully automated control system with feedback, 
the Yocsina plant employs the more technologically obsolete long dry kiln with no 
pre-heater 40/ and has a more rudimentary process and quality control system. 
40/ Although technologically obsolete in the sense of being a less efficient 
technology in terms of fuel utilisation which has subsequently been superceded by 
later innovations it must be remembered that the use of the pre-heater system 
relies on a supply of suitable raw materials and prehomogenisation equipment. 
Whether these conditions are met in Yocsina is not certain, so that the technology 
employed may in fact be the technically optimum one for that plant. Also it 
should be borne in mind that the limitation of choice of supplier caused by the 
source of the finance for this plant may well have influenced the choice of 
technology for this plant since United States manufacturers only manufacture pre-
heater systems under licence from European manufacturers and the use of these 
systems is much more limited in the United States than in Europe and other parts of 
the world. 
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As we showed in an earlier paper 4-1/ the long dry kiln has a standard fuel 
utilisation some 25% above that of the short kiln plus pre-heater which is 
consistent with the difference observed at these two Argentine plants. 
Another relevant factor is the difference between the sizes of the two kilns 
though there is not sufficient data available in these case studies which would 
indicate relative degrees of economies of scale in fuel utilisation for different 
technological processes of calcination in cement production. 42/ 
Another factor to take into account is the ability of the automation system 
at the Olavarria plant to effect savings in fuel consumption by finite control of 
the various production stages. Again with the kind of data available it is not 
possible to distinguish these effects. In the absence of more specific information 
we can only speculate that the most important direct causal factors in the 
difference in efficiency between the Olavarria and Yocsina kilns is the different 
technology utilised; and that the difference in scale of production and efficiency 
in process control are secondary contributing factors to the differential. In 
making this assumption we are conscious of the fact that it is mainly because 
there is more information available about the relative fuel consumption ratios 
between different technologies than there is between different sized kilns that 
leads us to conclude that the technology factor is the dominant one. Nevertheless, 
the universally accepted fact that the short dry kiln plus pre-heater is up to 
30% more efficient than the long dry kiln is conclusive; what evidence of 
economies of scale that exist indicate a decreasing scale factor as the size of 
kiln increases; the UNIDO study quoted in the first monograph indicated a cost of 
improvement of 17% for an increase in scale from a 500th.to 1,000,000 tpy 
plant, which covers the range of scale difference for the two kilns being compared 
here. Unfortunately the UNIDO study does not indicate which technologies are 
being utilised though the assumption is that it is the same technology for both 
capacity figures quoted. 43/ 
41/ See R. Pearson, IDB/ECLA 1977 (1), op. cit. 
42/ Various published studies have been concerned with economies of scale 
in cement production, or with relative efficiency of different technologies, but 
all have completely ignored the connection between scale and technique used, c.f. 
FIEL-UIA "Estructura de costos industriales en la ALALC, Tomo 111; Cemento, harina 
de pescado y hilados ". This comparison of costs in cement industries in the 
different ALALC countries states that the dry process saves between 25% and 30% 
over the wet process, but does not differentiate between the various technologies 
of the dry process nor does it allude to scale when discussing fuel utilisation. 
Discussion of scale does not single out the effect of scale on fuel utilisation, 
muech less the possibility of different long run cost curves relating to different 
technologies. See ale . Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Economico: Departamento 
de Planejamento: Departamento de Industrias de Benes de Capital: Paper on Machinery 
Suppliers in the Cement Industry, Rio de Janeiro, 1976, pp. 5-6. This study states 
that the dry process consumes less fuel and more electricity than the wet process; 
again no differentiation between different forms of the dry process is introduced 
nor any attempt is made to single out economies of scale for different dry processes. 
43/ See Pearson (1), 1977, op. cit., p. 27. The figures refer to a study 
contained in UNIDO; Industrial Branch Reports, The Cement Industry, UNIDO ITD 156, 
9/11/72. 
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Argentina de Cemento Portland 
The third biggest cement producer in Argentina is the United States owned 
firm Cia. Argentina de Cemento Portland S.A. This company operates two cement 
plants in Argentina - one at Sierras Bayas near Olavarria, Province of Buenos Aires, 
the other at Parana, in the river Province of Entre Rios. 
Parana plant 
The plant at Parana which has a total capacity of 146,000 tpy first went 
into production in 1938. The shortage of suitable raw materials in the area is 
the main constraint on the expansion of production at this plant. Because of the 
relatively low calcium carbonate concentration in the local materials utilised at 
the plant (only a 50% concentration), the single kiln wet-process plant uses the 
flotation system to make the slurry for calcination in order to extract the 
highest possible percentage of CaCo3 from the raw materials. At the time that this 
plant went into production the firm claims that there were only two other cement 
factories in the world using this system, one in France and the other in the 
United States of America. 
The wet process kiln at the Parana plant was manufactured by the Danish firm 
of F.L. Smidth. The age of the plant as well as the small scale of production and 
the fact that it is a wet process plant account for the high fuel utilisation and 
labour/output ratios shown in Table 13. 
Table 13 - Fuel utilisation and labour productivity at the Parana plant 
of Cia. Argentina de Cemento Portland 
(kilocalories per kilogramme and man hours per ton) 
Fuel utilisation (KCal/kg clinker): 1600 
Labour used in production (Man hours produced/ton cement): 4 
The fuel utilisation figure is. high even for the wet process; international 
standard fuel consumption was 1,250 in 1974, 44/ though as we commented above 
such figures are quoted with no reference to scale of production. Labour 
utilisation is also extremely high, though apparently below the figure given for 
the Kilometro 7 plant of C0RCEMAR, which is of similar size. 45/ 
44/ See Pearson, 1977, op. cit. 
45/ Ratios such as 4 or 5 man per ton of cement produced were quoted as 
orders-of magnitude rather than derived from specific detailed production data so 
should not perhaps be taken to® literally. 
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Sierras Bayas plant 
The plant at Sierras Bayas which first went into production in 1919 has been 
continuously expanded ever since (see Table 14). 
Table 14 - Capacity and technical parameters of kilns 
at the Sierras Bayas plant of Cia. Argentina de Cemento Portland 
(kilocalories per kilogramme, man-hours per ton and tons per day) 
Manufacturer Fuel 
Kiln Date of and type of utilisation Man-hours Capacity 
NÛ installation technology of KCal/kg per ton tpd 
kiln clinker 
1 1918 "All Fullers Average'^  Average 200 
Reeves 
2 1919 Brothers 1,600 for 200 
kilns. US 
3 1925 < dry process 1,400 > plant 200 
plant. Long 
4 1929 dry kilns. 1.55 200 
No preheaters. 
5 1936(?) R^otary coolers. 200 
6 1954 Allis Chalmers 1,200 500 
long dry kiln. 
7 1970 Dry process 900/1,000 700 





Source: Data compiled by the author. 
The most recent and largest expansion to the plant was made in 1970; a seventh 
kiln was added to the plant increasing the rated capacity from 585,000 tpy to 
845,000 tpy. This kiln also came on stream at about the same time as the kiln NQ 8 
at the Olavarria plant of Loma Negra and the kiln Na 2 at CORCEMAR's Yocsina plant. 
In contrast to the other new kilns mentioned which were installed by the Argentine 
companies and which consisted of new and in some cases innovatory technology, the 
line of production erected by Cia. Argentina de Cemento Portland at Sierras Bayas 
was in fact centred on a second-hand kiln plus ancillary equipment which had been 
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made redundant at one or more of the parent company's United States plants. 46/ 
The 700 tpd Allis Chalmers kiln which forms the centre of this production 
line was originally a wet process kiln when it was in production at Lone Star 
Inc's Lake Charles factory. The United States plant was apparently operating at 
a loss and the company decided its original feasibility study had been erroneous 
and there was no possibility of the plant becoming profitable. Lone Star 
therefore decided to write off the plant at this location. In order to adapt it 
for use at the Sierras Bayas plant the equipment was dismantled, the kiln 
shortened by several sections and modified by the addition of a single stage 
preheater, thus transforming it into a kiln for calcinating dry raw materials. 
The modification of the plant and its installation at Sierras Bayas was carried 
out by the technical departments of Lone Star in the United States and local 
staff had very little to do with the planning stage of the project (see Section 3 
of this paper). 
In spite of the fact that this is a modified second-hand production line it 
represents a considerable advance over the existing equipment at the plant in 
terms of efficiency. As Table 14 indicates, the fuel utilisation ratios of the 
rest of the plant were exceedingly inefficient by both international and Argentine 
standards, and though the pre-heater fitted to the new kiln was only a single 
stage one, it is the only preheater at the plant and achieves a 16% improvement 
in fuel consumption over the next biggest kiln installed and up to a 50% 
improvement over the pre-war kilns at the plant. 47/ 
The ancillary equipment used in conjunction with kiln N° 7 at the plant also 
represents technical advances in comparison with the plant already installed. The 
automatic grinders are capable of a much finer raw meal grinding than those used 
with the older kilns; the raw meal food into the preheater is controlled by 
automatic wigh-belts and the whole production line is controlled from a central 
control room which operates a closed circuit control system of the raw meal 
preparation stages and the kiln feed. 
The grate coolers, although standard equipment in most other cement plants 
erected over the past thirty years is a substantial technical advance over the old 
fashioned rotary coolers which are still used at Sierras Bayas in conjunction with 
the old kilns. 
The labour utilisation ratio at the plant is given as an average for the 
whole plant - at 1.55 man hours per ton of cement produced. In terms of the 
ratio of labour employed per ton of installed annual capacity the Sierras Bayas 
plant has a ratio of 1 man to 1,360 tons of capacity, which is inferior to the 
ratio at Yocsina and substantially worse than that of Loma Negra's larger plants. 
46/ It should be noted that this second-hand machinery was declared as such 
and imported at a relatively low book value. However, because of Argentina's 
strict embargo on the importing of second-hand machinery a special government 
decree had to be issued to allow the machinery into the country free of duty. 
47/ Again while the production technology no doubt accounts for the major 
part of~~the improvement in fuel utilisation efficiency recorded, it is not possible 
to distinguish the effect of scale on these results. 
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The fuel utilisation ratios quoted for the plant indicate that levels of 
efficiency are achieved which compare favourably with those at the Loma Negra 
plants for kilns with preheaters. In fact the Sierras Bayas ratio is comparable 
to the fuel utilisation ratio at the Yocsina plant where the largest kiln is a 
long dry kiln with no preheater; again it is difficult to interpret this 
comparison since it could be the result of greater technical skills on the part 
of the engineers operating the Sierras Bayas plant, or the fact that the . 
differences in scale between the two kilns compensate for the different 
technologies used. 
The plant at Sierras Bayas can be said to use less than optimal technology 
acquired second-hand from the parent company. From the point of view of the firm 
this was presumably a rational technology strategy since the raw materials 
accessible for cement production at the plant are running out and there is little 
prospect of a long-term expansion which would be the only basis on which a 
strategy of optimal technology investment could be pursued. One of the results 
of this technology strategy however, is that there is no development of technical 
capacity internal to the Argentine, as opposed to the parent company,which is the 
result of both the failure to use new process innovations and the complete lack of 
devolution of technical resources and decision making to the local subsidiary from 
the parent company. This will be discussed in greater detail in Section 3. 
7. Calera Avellaneda S.A. 
This company operates the third plant near the town of Olavarria, which is 
the only cement plant belonging to the firm. Since the installation of the newest 
production line, which went on stream at the end of 1974, the total installed 
capacity of the plant has been 845,000 tpy which is exactly equal in size to 
the Sierras Bayas plant of Cia. Argentina de Cemento Portland S.A. 
The original cement plant belonging to Calera Avellaneda which went on 
stream in 1934 was one of the first Lepol kilns to be used outside Western Europe. 48/ 
The capacity of this kiln is 300 tpd and it is apparently still functioning 
satisfactorily. The fuel utilisation ratio of this kiln is given as 1,100 KCal/kg 
clinker which compares favourably with the fuel utilisation ratios of its main 
competitors. 
Kiln Ns 2 is a Humboldt short dry kiln with suspension preheater which went 
into production in 1958. Again Calera Avellaneda were very prompt to incorporate 
this technical innovation into their productive capacity, Humboldt started putting 
the system on the market in the early 1950's though its widespread adoption was 
slowed down by the low rate of new investment in cement capacity in the early part 
of the decade. The Calera Avellaneda kiln is claimed to be the first Humboldt 
kiln with heat interchange by gas suspension installed in a South American plant. 
Certainly it was the first in Argentina. 
48/ The earliest date given for the commercial development of the Lepol 
kiln by Polysius was 1933, though very few were actually sold. Thus Calera Avella-
neda, no doubt, connected to the fact that the firm's original shareholders were 
all German immigrants, were very quick off the mark to get a Lepol kiln on stream 
in Argentina. 
- 50 -
The Humboldt kiln originally had a rated capacity of 350 tpd when it was 
first installed, but subsequent modifications and improvements carried out to the 
plant have increased its actual capacity to 530 tpd, bringing the total combined 
capacity of the two oldest kilns at the plant to 830 tpd (350,000 tpy). 
Table 15 - Fuel utilisation and labour productivity ratios 
at the Calera Avellaneda plant 








ton cement a/ 
Installed capacity 
per man employed 
(whole plant) b/ 
tpy 
1 1,100 
2 900 5. 50 680 
3 7 50 c/ 1.30 1,345 
Source: Data compiled by the author. 
a.J Labour usage figures refer to the total capacity of the plant before and 
after the new kiln went on stream. The figures referring to the enlarged plant 
were again projections made before the kiln went into production. 
b/ This figure is probably somewhat inflated since the inter-changeability 
of some labour with the lime plant which is alongside the cement plant at the 
Calera Avellaneda site made calculations of labour employed at the cement plant 
less than completely accurate. 
c/ This is a projection of optimal fuel utilisation for the new kiln went on 
stream. 
The third kiln at this plant which went on stream in November 1974 increased 
the capacity at the plant by 565,000 tpy to 7 50,000 tpy. The new kiln is also 
a Humboldt dry process kiln with suspension preheater similar in design to kiln Na 
2. The 1974 version however has a 4 stage cyclone-preheater with a Fuller grate 
cooler and the kiln feed is blended by a prehomogenisation unit with automatically 
controlled weigh-belt system. 
Automation at this plant is the conventional closed circuit system; control 
for the new line of production is centralised in a single control room whereas the 
control units for the different stages of production for the rest of the plant 
are distributed throughout the plant. 
Quality control in the plant is carried out in laboratories without the help 
of any automatic analysing equipment. Samples are prepared and brought to the 
laboratory by operatives; in the laboratory they are analysed by traditional 
methods and calculations about required corrections are made when the results of 
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the various tests are available. There is no automatic sampling procedure nor 
X-Ray equipment and there are no digital computers to assist calculations. 
Fuel utilisation at the plant is shown in Table 15. These figures appear 
to indicate an extremely efficient use of combustibles; it is interesting to note 
that the Calera Avellaneda plant is the only cement plant in Argentina which is 
albe to operate on natural gas, fuel, oil or coal. 
The new kiln which was expected to achieve a KCal/kg ratio of 7 50 cal is 
basically using the same technology as the older kiln Nc 2. The difference in 
the two fuel consumption ratios is accounted for by the larger scale of the new 
kiln and the superiority of the ancillary machinery connected with raw material 
blending and materials handling and transportation. 
The labour utilisation ratios at the plant before the inauguration of the 
new kiln was substantially higher than the other plants operating in the same 
area. Calera Avellaneda were complaining of chronic overmanning at the plant, 
which could not be improved other than by the expansion of capacity because of 
the strict laws about labour security which were operative at that time. There 
was also some difficulty of isolating especially general labour relating to the 
cement plant since a lot of employees and ancillary staff also performed duties in 
the neighbouring lime plant. However, the inauguration of the new kiln was 
expected to solve the overmanning problems; it was expected that no more than 50 
new workers would be recruited to operate the new kiln which represented an 
increase of over 100% of installed capacity at the plant. 
8. Cia. Sud Americana de Cemento Portland S.A. (Juan Minetti) 
The machinery and equipment employed at the three plants belonging to the 
Cia. Sud Americana de Cemento Portland S.A. (Juan Minetti e hijos) is considerably 
more obsolete than that in the other companies if only because the firm has made 
no major new investment in production capacity in recent years. Growth of the 
company has been centred on a proposed new plant at Malagueña in the Province of 
Cordoba which to date has not come to fruition. The plant at Mendoza was expanded 
by 140,000 tpy (4-00 tpd) in 1971 by the addition of another small dry process 
kiln. 
However, insufficient data was made available by this firm to make an 
adequate analysis of the technology employed. The inability of the company to 
obtain finance for the Malagueña project in the ten years at least since 
negotiations began is related to the low level of productivity at the plant and 
the lack of technical capacity which would be necessary to incorporate more modern 
technology under the present organisational structure. 
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Section 3 
ASSESSMENT OF TECHNICAL CAPACITY OF THE ARGENTINE CEMENT INDUSTRY: 
TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION, INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY WITHIN 
ARGENTINE CEMENT FIRMS 
1. Introduction 
In the previous section we assessed the level of technology incorporated 
into the Argentine cement industry in terms of the kind of equipment installed 
at the plants and the efficiency of that equipment when used on site at the 
various plants in the country. 
All the core technology at the plants is imported from suppliers in 
Europe or the United States. 49/ However, having accepted this fact we can 
observe considerable differences in the way in which different firms negotiate 
with suppliers for the acquisition of new capacity, which, together with the 
kind of equipment they purchase, helps to define the internal level of technical 
capacity of the firm. 
Similarly, the fact that core technology is supplied by international 
manufacturers implies that it is these manufacturers rather than the local 
cement firm which is responsible for innovations in process technology and 
equipment in the industry; nevertheless, as we saw in the discussion on the 
Mexican industry 50/ there is considerable scope for innovatory activities 
which effect minor modifications to plant such as the increase in capacity 
without the installation of new equipment, or the improvement of fuel consumption 
ratios, or the adoption of automation equipment to different production aspects 
of the plant. 
In order to assess the internal technical capacity of the different 
Argentine cement producers we look at both these aspects - technology acquisition, 
local innovation and also the firm's overall policy or strategy towards building 
up its internal technical skills, since the latter is relevant to its long term 
growth prospects. 
49/ The structure of the international industry supplying capital goods 
to the~cement industry is discussed at length in Pearson IDB/ECLA 1977 (1), op. 
cit. However, I do not mean to suggest here that there is no local content in 
cement plants in Argentina; a considerable amount of hardware and ancillary 
equipment can and is manufactured in the country, often by subsidiaries or 
recognised subcontractors of the main technology suppliers. Nevertheless, as in 
Mexico, all machinery or components requiring special engineering facilities for 
their manufacture (for example the bending of thick steel for kiln segments or 
the devices for firing kilns) are not manufactured in South America to date, 
although even this situation may be modified by various governments initiative 
to boost the local capital goods capacity in this area by making joint venture 
agreements with one or more of the international suppliers. 
50/ Pearson, IDB/ECLA, 1977 (2), op. cit. 
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2. Acquisition of technology and technical capacity in the firm of 
Lorna Negra S.A. 
The various new investments made by this company during the past five to 
ten years exhibit a variety of different patterns of technology acquisition, 
which are related to what kind of new technology was being acquired and for 
what purpose. 
Olavarria plant expansion 
The contract concerning the purchase of the new kiln Na 7 together with 
the ancillary equipment which comprises the whole line of production, and the 
automation system for which the kiln was acquired, was, strictly speaking, a 
turnkey contract. However there were a number of features about this contract 
which indicate that it was not the straightforward handing-over of technical 
responsibility that a turnkey contract generally implies, but that the firm were 
exercising a considerable degree of technical autonomy in negotiating with the 
suppliers, consistent with a positive and progressive long-term technical policy. 
The whole contract for the Olavarria expansion, including the automatic 
control system, is estimated to have cost the company some U$S 50,000,000 which 
corresponds to a cost of U$S 50 per ton of installed annual capacity. The 
contract was in fact a joint venture between various West German firms which 
were working in conjunction with the main supplier Polysius on the adaptation 
of automatic control systems for cement plants. The other firms involved were 
AEG, IBM (Stuttgart) and the Dickerdoff Zementewerke. Research on the system 
had been in progress for some two or three years before Loma Negra negotiated the 
contract for the Olavarria expansion, initially with Polysius. By this policy 
of agreeing to purchase technology which was still in the process of research 
and development to make innovations in automation technology adaptable to 
production conditions in cement manufacture, Loma Negra calculated that they 
were able to purchase a high technology plant at something like one third of its 
price on the market, when industrial research, including its installation at the 
Olavarria plant, had been concluded. 51/ 
However, we would not want to deny that this project was indeed a turnkey 
contract and that Loma Negra had contracted out to Polysius full responsibility 
for design of the plant, negotiation with subcontractor, and the project manage-
ment which included delivery, supervision of the erection of the plant, putting 
the plant on stream and ensuring that it operated according to guaranteed 
51/ In 1970 when the purchase was completed, the world market price for 
now corner.! capacity was estimated at between U$S 50 and 1J$S 100 per- for, <>f 
anriuai capacity. Invent merit c. or.tr, of the new Olavarria kiln war. e.-.t: inn I orl will.ir. 
this rang. Spokesmen for the company maintained that just three years later, an 
identical plant was sold for three times the price paid by Loma Negra. Even 
allowing for inflation it must be remembered that the price range given above 
refers to all conventional plants of various sizes installed at that time, 
whereas the Olavarria plant included very high technology elements both within 
and outside the automation system. 
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specifications. Technical staff from Loma Negra indicated that although they 
were constantly involved in collaboration and discussion with the main contractor, 
both in Argentina and in Germany, there were occasions when Polysius attempted to 
prevent Loma Negra having access to some of the innovatory design elements 
incorporated into the plant. 
The realisation of the project involved a considerable amount of technical 
assistance from the suppliers; but again this must be seen in context; about one 
third of the technical assistance involved (measured in man-months of foreign 
personnel employed) was concerned with the operation of the computer, the control 
process and associated instrumentation aspects and the automatic X-Ray analysis 
machinery. Since the incorporation of this equipment at the plant represented a 
net advance in the technology level in the firm, and since the technical assistance 
was finite in that within some 18 months the technical staff of the Argentine 
company were able to operate the system with no ongoing technical assistance, such 
activity can be seen as a net transference of technical knowledge to the firm, even 
though they were forced to purchase it from the suppliers at the rate set by the 
foreign firm for their technical services. 
Technical capacity at Loma Negra 
Various aspects of this project indicate that although there was this 
seemingly total dependence on the suppliers to provide the technological factors, 
the firm itself was possessed of sufficiente technical capacity to select, albeit 
in very general terms, a level of technology not yet tested and accepted on the 
world market, to assimilate that technology and to acquire the necessary skills 
to operate it and in variuos instances which are exemplified below to improve and 
adapt it to the particular production situation of the firm itself. 
The following are examples of technical achievements of the firm, in 
relation to the technology supplied as a turnkey contract, which indicate the level 
of technology capacity corresponding to the successful assimilation of this high 
technology project: 
(a) Maintenance system: This was worked out by the consultants acting 
on behalf of the main suppliers as providers of technical assistance. However, 
since that technical assistance terminated the electrical and electronic engineers 
employed by Loma Negra have been able to operate and modify an adequate 
maintenance system which includes programmed preventative maintenance as well as 
remedial maintenance. The computer, an IBM 1800 which was installed to operate 
the automated control system has been used to provide and update maintenance 
programmes and schedules. 
(b) The system as supplied by the foreign manufacturers left some 
problems unsolved which were crucial to the accurate operation of the automatic 
system installed. For example Polysius supplied only one sample programme for 
calibrating the X-Ray machine to carry out automatic analyses. The Loma Negra 
electronics engineer who was aware of the problems of variations in frequency 
under vacuum conditions recalibrated the system allowing for the variations in 
frequency and building in automatic corrective procedures into the programme. 
(c) The automatic system as supplied and put on stream by the manufacturers 
was supported by some 300 programmed which constituted the software of the 
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system. The electronis engineers at the plant amplified the scope of the system 
by producing another 400 programmes designed to satisfy particular production 
or planning problems incurred by the firm in both technical and administrative 
matters. For instance, the problem of optimal policy regarding maintenance of 
the refractory lining of the kiln was solved in terms of the particular situation 
of an Argentine cement producer operating under 1974 price and supply 
conditions. 52/ By using the computer, on the basis of data derived from the 
plant about the constituents and consistency of raw materials used and the 
efficiency of the kiln and the prehomOgenisation and pre-heating system, it was 
possible to calculate the equilibrium point between expenditure on replacement and 
maintenance of the refractory bricks and expenditure on the installation and 
precise operation of the prehomogenisation system. Having established the 
optimal point in terms of physical trade-off this was then converted into 
financial terms by systematic studying of the plant in process so that the 
optimum was able to be maintained by controlling the variation of raw material 
mix in the homogenisation plant by programmed sampling and automatic correction 
procedure. 
(d) The design engineering department of the firm has drawn up plans for 
the conversion of kilns Na 5 and 6 at the Olavarria plant from the wet process to 
the dry process with no outside technical assistance. This is a feedback from the 
conversion carried out at the Barker plant by the Danish company F.L. Smidth, 
though the possibility of conversion was discussed when plans for the Olavarria 
expansion were being drawn up. 
Technology acquisition at other Loma Negra plants 
Barker plant. 
The conversion of the two kilns at the Barker plant from the wet process to 
the dry process and the resulting savings in fuel consumption and cost were 
discussed in Section 2. 
Again the contract which was drawn up between Loma Negra and the suppliers 
- in this case F.L. Smidth for this conversion project could be described as a 
turnkey contract since the main suppliers carried out the basic design work and had 
total responisbility for all subcontractors and for the final operation and 
efficiency of the contract. However, as with the Olavarria contract for kiln Na 7 
there are features about this contract which differentiate it from what is 
normally understood by a turnkey contract and which indicate the internal technical 
capacity of the firm and give evidence of a long-run progressive technology 
policy both in terms of technology acquisition and in building up internal 
technical capacity. 
52/ Some of the raw materials required to make high quality refractory 
linings were not available in Argentina at that date; in addition to the trade-
off between good quality imported materials and inferior quality locally-made ones, 
there were also the problems of exchange control, import restrictions and storage 
and other associated costs of importing - both in terms of accessibility and 
financial costs. 
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The first aspect of the contract which deserves comment is the fact that 
the possibility of conversion was first suggested by the firm itself on the basis 
of studies carried out by the relevant technical departments. Secondly the 
contract was drawn up in two stages; the first which accounted for some 50% of 
the U$S 6.8 million cost was concerned with the new equipment and related works 
necessary to convert the kilns from the wet process to the dry process. The 
second half of the contract was concerned with the installation of electrostatic 
and mechanical filters which increased the recuperation of clinker from the system, 
improving the raw materials-clinker ratio and thus the productivity of the whole 
system. The first half of the contract - the conversion of the kilns - resulted 
in an increase of capacity of some 2.0% over existing capacity of the kilns. The 
installation of the filters increased productivity by a further 8 - 10% and, 
significantly, decreased environmental pollution from dust emission. At that 
date there was no effective legislation in Argentina to control industrial pollution 
from cement plants and the installation of these filters can be seen as a 
progressive measure in both technical and environmental terms as well as an 
investment which was bound to pay off in the long run as legislation about pollution 
becomes more widespread. 
The terms of the contract with F.L. Smidth differed from the standard turnkey 
contract; Loma Negra's contract specifically stated that the designs and drawings 
from which the project was carried out would be the property of the client company. 
The technical departments of Loma Negra were consulted at all stages of the design 
and erection of the project and, as we have observed above, the technical 
departments have been able to design the conversions of kilns Ns 5 and 6 at the 
Olavarria plant on the basis of the technical knowledge acquired in the process of 
the Barker project. , 
Zapala plant. 
This plant is the newest complete plant erected in Argentina, 53/ and in 
spite of its relatively small size arising from its descentralised location, 
represents a level of technology which is completely up to date in terms of the 
conventional and industrial technology on the market at the time the contract was 
negotiated. However the way in which it was purchased - a straightforward turnkey 
contract from the German firm of Humboldt - must be judged not solely in relation 
to the technology acquisition policy of Loma Negra regarding its other plants, but 
must take into account the fact that the negotiations for the plant were virtually 
completed before Loma Negra had any official participation or management and 
technical responsibility for the plant. 
The original owners of the company that entered the negotiations with the 
suppliers, eia. Naviera Perez Companc S.A., had no experience in cement manufacture 
and no knowledge of alternative technologies on the market. The technology that 
was eventually purchased, a 200,000 tpy dry process plant with preheater and 
short kiln was purchased at a cost of approximately U$S 75 per ton of installed 
capacity which was a reasonable price for modern but small scale technology at the 
time when the purchase was made (1968). 
53/ Since 1974 the State owned El Gigante plant has been put on stream. 
The contract allowed for the services of 8 foreign engineers form the 
supplying company to give technical assistance for a period of up to 2 years, 
though it was not clear whether the intervention of Loma Negra, when it took 
responsibility for technical and administrative management of the plant as well 
as bought a financial participation in the new company, modified previously 
negotiated terms and conditions for technical assistance from the European 
suppliers. 
Overall technical policy of the Argentine firm of Loma Negra S.A. 
The most significant fact about the long term technical strategy of the firm 
of Loma Negra is that it not only exists but has been very clearly planned and 
formulated. In spite of the fact that this company operates, in common with any 
other nationally owned cement company in Latin America, in a situation where it is 
dependent on a small group of foreign suppliers and specialist consultancy groups 
for access to new technology of cement production, Loma Negra has been able to 
isolate various factors within its own control which have improved its negotiating 
position with the suppliers as well as building up its own internal technical 
capacity. 
Its policy on new technology acquisition is a central part of this strategy; 
in both the projects described in detail above, the kiln Na 7 at Olavarria and the 
conversion of the kilns at Barker plant, Loma Negra specifically negotiated the 
purchase of technology that was a) still in the process of industrial research 
and development which meant that the firm could not only purchase the technology 
at a relatively cheaper price than the fully researched market-developed version 
would cost, but also share to some extent in the development of the innovation being 
utilised, thus building up the knowledge and experience of its own design and 
operational engineering staff. In addition the technology acquired, though 
purchased specifically in conjunction with one production line in one particular 
plant, had in the long term applications for use outside that particular situation, 
in other plants belonging to the firm, and, in the case of the automation system, 
computer, for administrative and design tasks concerning the whole company's 
operation. 
The Barker conversion was also evidence of a technological strategy which 
was orientated to long-term technical needs of the firm as well as to solve 
immediate problems of cost and capacity. At the time when the fieldwork was 
carried out the firm had already used the technical know-how, bought from F.L. 
Smidth as a turnkey contract some four years previously to design the conversion 
of wet process kilns at the Olavarria plant. 
The firm backs up this policy of technology selection in the context of its 
long term technical requirements by employing five or six "special area specialists" 
whose duties include keeping abreast of all technical developments in their fields 
To this end, Loma Negra staff regularly make study visits to machinery suppliers 
and cement technology and automation consultants in the United States, Europe and 
Japan in order to see first-hand what new technical developments are in progress. 
Such a technical policy is rather unusual in the context of the Latin 
American cement producers. One explanation of the singularity of Loma Negra's 
technical policy is that such a policy can only pay off when the size of the firm's 
operations are sufficient to warrant such a large investment in the acquisition of 
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technical know how and experience. However the size of the market in most Latin 
American markets is generally too small to support firms of the scale of Loma 
Negra, even in the larger countries, where the total market is sufficient, it is 
still only one or two firms at the most that can operate in this manner. In the 
Mexican industry at least one of the largest firms had foreign participation, which 
negated the justification of investing so much of the firms' own resources in 
building up its autonomous technical capacity. 
3. Acquisition of technology and technical capacity in the firm of 
CORCEMAR S.A. 
The technology incorporated into the new production line at the Yocsina 
plant of CORCEMAR was described in the previous section; the kind of process 
technology selected represented the standard equipment available on the market. 
This was incorporated into a plant which had been carefully designed, specifically 
to reduce labour utilisation by mechanising much of the materials handling and 
transportation functions. Control was effected by standard closed circuit control 
systems, centralised in a single control room. 
It is difficult to judge what effective choice the technical staff of 
CORCEMAR were able to exercise in the selection of the process and equipment 
utilised at this plant. The dollar cost of the project, which amounted to some 
U$S 6 millin 54/ was financed by a line of credit from the Export-Import Bank of 
the United States. The contract between CORCEMAR and the EXIM Bank - no doubt a 
standard contract of this nature - placed the following restrictions on the 
Argentine company as conditions for receiving the dollar credit from the Bank: 
1) All equipment purchased with monies from the loan must be manufactured 
and originate in the United States. 
2) The Bank has the obligation to approve of the selection of all equipment 
before purchase is authorised. 
3) The Bank has the right to demand access to all plans, company books and 
accounts and to inspect equipment before it is exported and to send inspectors to 
the site of erection. 
4) All such equipment must be transported by United States freight and 
insured with United States insurance companies. 
5) All repayments must be made in dollars. The firm undertakes not to meet 
dividend commitments to its shareholders if such payments amount to more than 50% 
of its net profits, or 23% of its net assets until all financial commitments to 
the Export-Import Bank have been paid. 
6) To supply the Export-Import Bank copies of all documents and 
correspondence concerning the project; such documents and correspondece must be 
54/ This was the original credit level set in 1969. The sum may have been 
subsequently increased. 
- 59 -
accompanied by an English translation. 
The terms in which this contract is formulated indicate that the purchaser 
was clearly restricted to United States supplies for its choice of equipment; in 
the previous section we indicated that this restriction may well have limited the 
technical range of alternatives open to the plant since the most up to date 
techniology on the market, and of course, the most recent innovations in the sector, 
were being developed by European and Japanese manufacturers; the by-now standard 
preheater technology was only manufactured by United States firms under license 
from the European patent holders. 
Another significant restriction originating with the terms of this loan is 
the fact that the loan will only cover the dollar cost of goods and services 
required for the project. This means that had the Argentine firm wished to 
increase the local content of the equipment used for the project it would have 
needed separate financing for Argentine produced goods, since the credit from the 
Export-Import Bank is not transferable to non-dollar costs. 
The United States suppliers, Fullers Co. supplied not only all the equipment 
for the whole production line under what was effectively a turnkey contract, but 
also supplied technical assistance, which in some cases lasted up to two years. 55/ 
Although the firm has a large number of technically qualified staff - up to 
50 engineers according to the Head Office, most of the design work was carried 
out by the suppliers. CORCEMAR had sole responsibility for the engineering works 
associated with the erection of the plant, but Fullers were responsible for the 
detailed design, plant procurement, transportation and erection. 
Technical capacity of CORCEMAR 
Because of the fact that CORCEMAR is based in Cordoba and the majority of 
its production and market is centred in that Province, the firm is isolated from 
the effects of the more competitive situation around' Buenos Aires, and has not 
been forced to adopt a clear strategy regarding the incorporation of new technology 
to increase production efficiency at its plants. 
In the previous section we compared the efficiency of the technology used 
by CORCEMAR with that of the new Olavarria plant; the inferiority of the 
technical efficiency parameters at Yocsina were attributed to different technologies 
(including here different methods of process control) as well as to differences in 
the scale of the two kilns. In the brief plant visit made to the Yocsina plant 
and to the Head Office of CORCEMAR, it was evident that this firm does not have 
the technical capacity to incorporate new systems of production control (automation) 
55/ The technical assistance from the suppliers was connected with the 
suppliers' responsibility for the erection of the plant, getting it on stream and 
ensuring it opearated at guaranteed capacity. A sum of 1/2 million dollars was 
included in the original estimates for this purpose. A total number of 15 
engineers were sent by Fullers to the plant; because of problems of loss of 
production arising from defective equipment (mainly cement ginders) 5 of the 
engineers stayed for up to two years. 
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nor to negotiate with suppliers to obtain a technological solution outside that 
conventionally offered in order to increase the productivity of the plant 56/. 
Neither was there evidence of a long term strategy of improved technical 
capacity which, in the case of Loma Negra at least, was cited as a further reason 
for incorporating innovatory techniques still being developed industrially into 
their production system. 
Nevertheless the technical departments of CORCEMAR were well informed as to 
the existence of new and different technologies other than those which they were 
using, and their technical staff was certainly a fairly large overhead cost for 
the firm to carry. Further investigations in more detail would be necessary to 
assess whether the technical capacity contained in the qualified engineers 
employed by the firm could be more effectively utilised to negotiate better terms 
with suppliers, or to obtain more efficient technology for new investment projects, 
though it should also be remembered that the cost of such reorganisation might 
not be justified in terms of the market situation of this particular supplier. 57/ 
Acquisition of technology and technical capacity in the firm of 
Cia. Argentina de Cemento Portland S. A. 
The process of technology purchase and procurement for the plants belonging 
to the Cia. Argentina de Cemento Portland are entirely determined by the fact that 
this company is a fully-owned subsidiary of a United States firm. As such, the 
Argentine company is dependent on policy decisions made at the company head-
quarters in the United States for decisions, both in general about the nature and 
size of new investments, and in detail about what kind of technology should be 
purchased from which suppliers. 
The expansion of the Sierras Bayas plant in 1968 by the addition of a seventh 
kiln, clearly illustrates the relationship between parent company and subsidiary 
in matters of technology acquisition. As we discussed in the previous section, the 
basic machinery which makes up this production line was imported from the United 
States having been dismantled from another of the parent company's plants. The 
reason that the plant was obsolete in the United States factory is apparently that 
the original feasibility studies on which investment at Lone Star Cement plants at 
Lake Charles, Louisiana and Hudson, New York, was based was found to be inaccurate. 
Lone Star Inc. decided to recuperate a percentage of the investment by shipping the 
equipment to the Sierras Bayas plant, though it must be remembered that kiln NQ 7 
at Sierras Bayas was considerably modified from the original Lake Charles equipment 
(see Section 2). 
56/ Productivity is of course only increased by the adoption of innovatory 
techniques if there is the internal technical capacity necessary to operate those 
techniques effectively. In some cases - for example the Mexican firm which 
purchased a computer to operate the kiln and then was unable to use it - lack of 
technical capacity renders ineffective productivity-oriented innovation. 
57/ Again we come back to the point that while it may be in the overall 
interest of the economy - in terms of long run foreign exchange saving to increase 
local technical capacity, the advantages to the individual producer of adopting 
such a strategy are often insufficient to persuade him to incur such costs. 
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The decision to import this second-hand kiln was entirely the responsibility 
of the parent company; the policy of the company regarding the technical autonomy 
of local subsidiaries is that the latter have autonomy only in expenditures which 
can be met out of the local firm's cash flow, and can be obtained locally. Any 
significant investment in new plant or equipment is thus the concern of the parent 
company. In the Sierras Bayas investment, as with other investments made by 
overseas subsidiaries, the parent company carried out the feasibility study, 
negotiated with all suppliers and supervised the design and erection of the plant. 
While the plant was being constructed the parent company sent engineers and 
trouble shooters to the Argentine plant, and progress on the project had to be 
reported several times per week to the United States Headquarters. 
The financing of new investment is also entirely in the hands of the parent 
company. The expansion at Sierras Bayas was financed partly by a capital transfer 
from the Head Office, which took the form of an increase in direct investment 
capital in the Argentine firm, and partly by suppliers and other credits. The 
increase in direct investment is made under a decree authorising increase in 
foreign investment, and is subject to the same repatriation of profits restrictions 
as any other form of foreign investment. 
Technical capacity at the Cia. Argentina de Cemento Portland S.A. 
The relationship between the American parent company and its Argentine 
subsidiary which has been described as "direct and dictatorial" evidently has a 
negative effect on developing local technical capacity at the Argentine firm. 
Because the local firm has little technical responsibility, technical staff 
are comparatively few; the Sierras Bayas plant, with a productive capacity of 
845,000 tpy employed only 8 qualified engineers for the whole plant, out of a 
total of 40 technical staff. The Loma Negra plant, in contrast employed more 
than double the number of engineers out of a total technical staff of 90 people. 
The technical duties of the engineers at the plant are restricted to routine 
production and quality control functions. All other technical problems are 
handled by Lone Star's central Technical Services Department in the United States. 
This department services the Argentine plants, and the other overseas subsidiaries 
in Uruguay, Brazil and Spain, as though they were located within the United States; 
policy about centralisation of technical research, problem solving and development 
of innovations has not been modified to take into accouftt the particular needs 
of the host country where the subsidiaries are located. On the few occasions 
when the local staff try to initiate ideas for modification at the plant - for 
instance a project to improve the efficiency of the homogenisation process was 
being mooted at the time the field visit was made - the ideas have to be submitted 
to Head Office for approval and final design; any innovation originating at the 
local plant becomes the property of the parent company, though no financial payment 
is made for this tranc'er. 
However the opportunity for the development of innovation at the local plant 
is very slight. The technical staff at the plant have no incentive to keep 
themselves informed about technical progress and relevant innovations developed 
in other parts of the world since there Is little opportunity to utilise such 
information in the course of their duties at the plant. Since there is currently 
no prospect of expansion at either of the Argentine plants of this company the 
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opportunities for being involved in new investment projects which might incorpo-
rate new technology are also extremely limited. 
5. Acquisition of technology and technical capacity in the firm 
of Calera Avellaneda S.A. 
The way in which the expansion of the Calera Avellaneda plant, which went 
on stream at the end of 1974, was negotiated is perhaps untypical of a general 
technical policy of the firm since it took place in extraordinary circumstances. 
The expansion of the plant was first discussed in 1961 but certain factors 
connected with the ownership of a minority part of the shares of the company 
prevented the Board of Directors obtaining authorisation to proceed with the 
expansion for several years. 
The project was finally authorised in 1969 when the project had to be 
totally redesigned and refinanced. The contract was awarded to the German firm 
of Klockner-Humboldt-Deutz in the form of a turnkey contract. Humboldt carried 
out the design engineering for the production line and was responsible for the 
procurement and erection of the plant as well as getting the plant on stream 
and training the local staff in its operation. 
Since the terms of the contract gave Humboldt autonomy over procurement of 
plant it was able to switch manufacture of the core technology for the plant 
from its works in West Germany to a Spanish subsidiary - Centurion Española de 
Coordinación Técnica y Financiera S.A. de Madrid, which produces Humboldt plants 
under licence. The reason given for this change of manufacturer was that the 
German firm was experiencing problems of industrial relations and cost control, 
though it appears that financial reasons were also instrumental in the change 
of location. 58/ Although plant manufactured under licence still carries the 
main suppliers guarantee and is designed and erected by Humboldt itself, the 
Argentine firm was predicting extra problems in getting the plant to operate 
according to design specifications because of the change of manufacturer. In 
the event the plant was some 6 to 9 months delayed in getting into production 
some of which was attributed to problems of coordination between suppliers. 
Part of the Calera Avellaneda expansion was financed by the International 
Finance Corporation of the IBRD. In order to obtain this credit the firm had to 
satisfy the IFC that the technical and financial appraisals of the project were 
correct and that the investment would be a profitable one. As with the majority 
of IFC financed investments in the cement industry the technical responsibility 
for the project was clearly placed in the hands of a foreign consultant - in 
this case the major machinery supplier Klockner Humboldt Deutz. 59/ 
58/ In the early 1970's Spain had a supply of dollar credit obtained from 
its tourist industry and it is alleged that Humboldt wished to use this credit 
source to finance part of the contract covered by suppliers' credit. 
59/ See IFC in Latin America: 1972. 
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Technical capacity at Calera Avellaneda S.A. 
The problems associated with this project have not been conducive to the 
development of internal technical capacity in the firm; in the event, the form in 
which the contract was celebrated and executed meant that much of the technical 
responsibilities for technology selection, design and project management were 
carried out by the machinery suppliers and not by the firm's own technical 
departments. 
However, there are other factors which also work against the development of 
an independant technical policy. The fact that the firm only operates a single 
cement plant in Argentina means that overhead costs associated with training and 
maintaining specialised engineering skills in the firm cannot be spread over nor 
used by other plants; nor is there a possibility of continuous employment for 
such staff in investment projects at other plants. 
The experience of the Calera Avellaned plant - one new kiln in fifteen 
years-is hardly an incentive for encouraging technical staff to keep up to date 
with innovations in cement process technology. 60/ 
The historic association of the owners and directors of the firm with 
Germanv is also significant since the majority of the important innovations in 
cement technology have been developed bv German industry. It is not therefore 
surprising that the firm's directors have always bought their new technology 
from German suppliers, a policy which has proved both technically and financial-
ly satisfactory. 
6. Acquisition óf technology and technical áápaáity in thè firm of 
Cia. Sudamericana de Cemento Portland (Juan Minetti S.A.) 
As we indicated earlier this company refused permission for a factory 
visit and allowed only a very brief and inconsequential Head Office interview. 
There is therefore no data on which we can base precise conclusions about the 
technology acquisition process within the firm, nor about the level of internal 
technical capacity. 
Such information as is available indicates that the failure of this firm 
to maintain its market share in post-war years and its relatively low 
capacity-utilisation ratios, are indicative of obsolete technical and manage-
rial procedures within the firm. The failure to negotáte successfully the new 
plant projected in Cordoba Province was specifically blamed on archaic 
management and financial policies which meant overseas financial sources, 
especially machinery suppliers and international credit institutions have no 
confidence in the technical or commercial abilities of the firm to operate 
successfully a new plant in current market conditions. 
In such a context it is unlikely that the firm would actively encourage 
60/ Again this firm illustrates the fact that the interests of the economy 
as a whole in developing its own technical capacity is not always compatible with 
the interests of individual firms. 
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the development of its internal technical capacities nor the kind of technical 
innovation which allows local firms to improve the performance of imported 




LEVEL OF TECHNOLOGY, TECHNICAL CAPACITY AND INNOVATION IN 
THE ARGENTINE CEMENT INDUSTRY: CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have traced the growth of the Argentine cement industry 
from its early beginnings at the start of the twentieth century, when the country 
was virtually dependent on imported cement, through its first major expansion 
period of the 1930's up to the present decade when importing cement is now a rare 
occurrence, caused by extreme and temporary market dislocations. 
As we found in the paper on the Mexican cement industry, the level of 
technology incorporated into Argentina's productive capacity does not diverge 
greatly from the standard process technology used by the cement industry at an 
international level. Somo innovations, such as the Japanese invented pre-
calcination techniques have not been taken up by Argentine producers bur it should 
be remembered that very few large scale new investments have taken place since 
1970 at which time pre-calcination techniques were not being marketed on a 
commercial scale. On the other hand in some areas, most notably the application 
of automation to cement production, certain c^tors of the Argentine cement 
industry are in fact more advanced than the international norm in terms of the 
technology of control processes used in their plants. 
Again we were faced with the conclusion that there is a wide divergence in 
the level of technology, technical capacity and ability for local innovation 
between the different firms comprising the Argentine cement industry; and this 
difference is evident not in terms of core technology which is purchased from 
foreign suppliers by all Argentine firms, but in the kind of process control 
systems used in conjunction with that technology and the capacity of local firms 
to participate in the selection, design implementation and adaption of the core 
technology so purchased. However, in contrast to the Mexican case we found here 
that those firms which were in the vanguard in terms of technology utilised and 
technical and innovatory capacity were not those firms which had the closest links 
with foreign cement producing companies; indeed the only firm which is a fully 
owned subsidiary of a foreign (US) company has lost its former market dominant 
position which it held up to the second world war and has since not introduced 
any technology noteworthy for its sophistication or innovatory characteristics in 
comparison with other cement plants in the country. In terms of building up 
local capacity for carrying out innovations and adaptations to imported equipment, 
and for participating in the selection, design and implementation of new projects 
the foreign owned firm was lacking in any positive policy; instead it treated its 
Argentine subsidiary as if it were a domestic subsidiery and thus relied on the 
firms central technical departments for all kinds of technical inputs. 
The reason why some Argentine firms have become market leaders and have 
strengthened their own technical capacities, and have embarked on programmes of 
modification and adaptation of process equipment at their own plants, while others 
have remained stagnant, and continue to relie on foreign technical assistance can 
be explained, at least in part by the way the cement industry in Argentina has 
developed in the context of the growth of the Argentine economy during the present 
century. As with many other kinds of economic activity in the country, the main 
markets and thus the main producing centres for the cement industry are firstly 
in the area around Greater Buenos Aires, and secondly the industrial centres 
around Cordoba. Thus the firms which were able to secure those markets, and 
equally important, that were able to expand their productive capacity in line 
with the periodic growth spurts of these, especially the provincial markets, were 
those whose future growth could be assured and who were able to invest money, men 
and resources into their own internal technical development. On the other hand 
those firms which were serving markets with a more sluggish growth rate did not 
have the opportunity to increase their efficiency and level of technology utilised 
by frequent additions of new capacity and have tended to fall behind in matters 
of technology and development of technically qualified staff. 
Lastly we were able to demonstrate that, from the point of view of individual 
firms, it is not always in their best interests to adopt a progressive technology 
policy in order to lessen its dependence on external technical assistance. While 
it may be in the interests of the whole country, from a macro economic point of 
view in order to reduce foreign exchange costs of new investment and to increase 
the country's pool of trained scientists and engineers in order to make rational 
and appropiate investment decisions and to be able to service technology once 
adquired, the cost to the individual firm of following such a policy is often 
uneconomic. For this reason it is essential that government policies.concerned 
with lessening technological dependence and with promoting national technical 
capacity should take into account the different possibilities of different 
firms to carry out such policies*, if the smaller firms are not aided by 
appropiate incentives the result of an undiscriminating policy to promote 
national technical capacity may well be to increase the economic concentration 




As we have mentioned at several points in this paper, the field work on 
which most of the observations contained herein are based was carried out during 
1974. Although we believe that there has been little substantive change in the 
structure of the Argentine cement industry, and that no major new investments 
have been carried out incoporating new technology such as would alter the 
comparisons between firms made in this paper, there may well have been changes 
in managerial policy by individual firms which could modify the conclusions made 
here. If this is thè case the author would be pleased to receive comments from 
the firms concerned and to incorporate them into a final version of this paper. 
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